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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Current Situation 
The present economi c situation has placed a great deal of 
financial stress on the agricultural sector. Bumper crops 
over the past few years have given rise to huge surpluses and 
low prices. The cost of production for some crops has not 
fallen, and there has been financial stress on some farmers. 
To maintain viable operations, farmers need adequate cash flow 
to meet their day - to-day expenses. This is true for beginning 
farmers in particular. Many have financed their operations by 
using large amounts of long term debt. Borrowing fun ds has 
become very expensive. Real intere st rates have increa sed 
stead ily over the past several years and require cash . Taxes 
also compete with other uses of funds that farmers have avail-
able for investments, debt service and current expenses . 
Agribusiness firms are experiencing similar problems. 
Many farm input and supply cooperatives have felt a severe 
income squeeze . The equity financing in a cooperative is 
provided by the farmer-members . Hence, the cooperative must 
compete with other capita l ne eds i n the members' farm 
operations. There is an opport unity cost for farmers when 
they invest in their cooperative . Yet, if a cooperative is 
not given adequate capital it will not be able to continue t o 
serve the functions that it was established to accomplish . 
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Cooperatives were implemented by farmers to provide collective 
power they lack individually . Cooperatives also provide 
inputs at a competitive price, a product marketing mechanism, 
and other services. 
By law , a cooperative is def i ned as a business that 
operates at cost [33] . However, it is acceptable ( and even 
necessary in many cases ) to have net earnings at the end of 
the accounting period . It would be nearly impossible for 
cooperatives to do busine ss on a buy-sell basis and net ou t 
receipts exactly equal to cost . Perfect information is not 
available to establish prices in order to accomplish this . 
Therefore , cooperatives may distribute these earning s to 
members i n t he f orm of refunds without taxation if the distr i -
bution is based on patronage. However, if nonmember business 
is done, the cooperative must keep (as unallocated capital 
surplus) the portion of the earnings that are nonmember 
so ur ced . Co rporate ta xes must be paid on the nonmember 
sourced portion of the business done . This ruli ng does not 
apply if a cooperative can establish that on ly member busines s 
was transacted during the period. 
The member - sourced portion of earnings may be di s tributed 
to members in t he form of equity in the coo perat ive or as 
c ash . According to generally accepted cooperative principles, 
the distribution of earnings to each member is based on memb er 
patronage of the cooperative in that year . There is generally 
3 
a limit on returns to financial investment by the member. The 
proportion of cash and equity certificate is left to the 
discretion of the board of directors . The board is 
co nstrained in its distribution decisions by the financial 
needs of the cooperative and the desire to satisfy their 
members . 
The manner in which earnings are distributed varies among 
cooperatives. By law, at least 20 percent of the distribution 
must be in cash if the cooper ative is distributing qualified 
wr it ten notices of allocation . The cash porti on ( in theory ) 
is issued to defray the income tax liabilities of members on 
the distribution. It is up t o the board to determine whether 
they want to increase the cash portion to greater than 20 
percent . 
As a second option, the board may choose to distribute 
nonqualified written noti ces of allocation instead of 
qualified notices and cash. If this option is taken, no cash 
portion is required . However, the cooperative must pay 
corporate taxes due . A third option (in some states ) allows 
the cooperative to retain the earnings as unallocated capital 
surplus and pay corporate taxes due . 
Problem - Earnings Distribution 
The distribution of earnings by coope rat ives to their 
members has become a controversial subject among members, 
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lenders, and management. Among members, a potentia l conflict 
may arise because all members are not in the same ta x 
bracket. As a result, the method used to distribute earnings 
may affect the members in lower tax brackets differently than 
members in the upper tax brackets . The members in marginal 
tax brackets above 35 percent usually do not receive a cash 
patronage large enough to defray the tax liability on their 
distribution, . while members in marginal ta x brackets bel ow 35 
percent often have positive net cash flow from their 
distribution . 
Between management and members there can also be 
conflicting interests. Managers are concerned about earnings 
and are often pressured to show "healthy" net earnings. But 
large net earnings can mean that members are paying higher 
prices than necessary for supplies, or members are recei vi ng 
less for their products . Even when prices are competiti ve, 
managers may be wary of rapid depreciation and how res ul tant 
lower earnings may be interpreted by members. Managers are 
much more aware of the financial needs of the cooperative than 
many members. Consequently, managers may see a need t o r eta i n 
larger amounts of equity to maintain operations and to gr ow. 
Members, on the other hand, may want as much of the 
distribution as possible in cash to put into their own 
operati ons and offset negative c ash flow impacts fr om ta xes. 
5 
Another conflict arises between the cooperative (manager 
and members) and lending institutions. Lenders want to be 
assured that the cooperative can meet interest expenses and 
repay loans over the lo ng run. To the cooperative, this means 
that they must have growth in equities and maintain large 
amounts of wor king capital . But at the same time, the 
cooperative would like to retire equities. This requires 
working capital which could otherwise be used to retire debt . 
These potential conflicts can be resolved properly on l y 
if all parties fully understand the consequences to each party 
of the alternative solutions. The method a cooperative 
selects to distribute earnings is ultimately left to the 
discretion of the board of directors, who often find them-
selves pulled i n thre e directions. 
First, they need to ensure that the cooperative has 
adequate debt and equity capital to maintain the present 
functions and to allow for future growth. Second, they want 
to distribute the earnings in a manner that will place me mbers 
in all tax brackets in a position where their cash distribu-
tion is large e nough to cover the accompanying tax l i ability 
on t he noncash equity distribution. Third, they want to 
maintain member equity (o wn ership) in the cooperative in 
proportion to the current patronage of the members . Pursuit 
of these three objectives under the cond i ti on of net operat i ng 
income and losses at the local cooperative level wi 11 be the 
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focus of this study. It is the overall objective of this 
study to examine these earnings distribution issues and how 
members would be affected. 
Literature review 
The di l emma faced by the board of dir~ctors today is in 
part a result of an historical problem of cooperatives . Over 
the years, there has been some confusion and differing opinion 
about the primary objective of a cooperative [40, 32, 45]. 
Differing opinions have been advanced by managers, board 
presidents, farmers, and agricultural economists. A survey by 
McCabe in 1966 asked managers and board presidents to rank 
different objectives of cooperatives in order of importance . 
The primary goal for both groups was the desire to achieve a 
'satisfactory' net savings . Most i mportant, the study 
revealed a wide difference of opinion among the managers and 
board presidents concerning the importance of maximizing 
member net income. As a whole, the board presidents ranked it 
third in importance while managers ranked it eleventh among 
the 12 alternative objectives presented in the survey. 
Ladd has compiled a review of economic literature in 
which he has addressed the issue [40] . Economists have 
defined a cooperative as an economic entity whose owners are 
its users. The members organize, own, and contro l the entity, 
and it is operated for their mutual benefit [48] . According 
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to Ladd, the cooperative should pursue a course that will 
ma ximi ze net member benefits. This should be the pri mary 
objective of a cooperative [40]. Ladd sites support f or thi s 
argument in the works of Mc Cabe, Schaars, Bar, Powell, Nourse, 
Koller, and Robotka [40]. 
The goal of individua l members of a farmer owned coopera-
tive is to maximize profits in their own farm operations . The 
individuals have joined together in order to augment their 
farm based profit - ma ximizing strategies. The cooperative is 
not independent of its members and it does not "pursue its own 
economic career" [48 p.104]. Therefore, the goal of a 
cooperative sho u ld be to ma xi mize the total profits of its 
members [40]. 
Ladd states that the goal of maximizing cooperative net 
savings is not going to ach ie ve ma ximum prof its f or members 
because net savi ngs are frequently only a small pa r t of the 
members• income. The porti on of net savings that they receive 
as a patronage refund is directly related to t he prices they 
pay for inputs and the pr ice s they receive f or their products . 
The major portion of their in co me and expenses are a result of 
these prices not the earnings of the cooperative . 
Robotka describes the prices as only "tentat ive settle -
ments" subject to an adjustment t o a cost basis after final 
accounting takes place at the cooperative f or the relevant 
patronage peri od (us ual ly a year). The patronage refund is a 
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device designed to adjust the "tentative settlement" t o a cost 
basis. 
If the cooperative 's goal is t o maximize net savings, it 
is only increasing the adjustment that needs t o be made at the 
end of the accounting period. Hence, ma ximization of net 
savi ngs is not necessarily consistent with maximization of net 
member benefits. Nonetheless, pricing strategy is rele vant to 
members since many of them are concerned about cash flow on a 
day - to-day basis rath er than receiving a lump sum of c as h onc e 
a year . 
Based on these findings, the manager s and board of 
directors should examine their pr icing strategy , financia l 
structure, and investment decisions in light of the objective 
of maximizing net member benefits, not of achieving a maximum 
net savings. The scope of this study was limited to the 
enhancement of net member benefits given an existing pri cing 
and investment strategy for the cooperative . 
Objectives 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the alternative 
methods of calculating and distributing earnings (lo sses ) that 
are available to cooperatives today. A major criterion ( in 
addition to the impacts of earnings distributi on on the coop -
erative) will be net member benefits. The spec i fic objectives 
are as follows: 
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1) To examine the effects on taxable income of imple -
menting the accelerated cost recovery system (ACRS) , a primary 
feature of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA ) , as 
opposed to using the straight-line methods which are allowable 
under ERTA [62] . 
2) To determine the total tax requirements for both the 
cooperative and its members and to determine cash flow 
implications to the coo perati ve and to its members ( by 
selected tax bracket s) under the rapid-ACRS and straight-line 
depreciation (ACRS - SL) methods if: 
a ) patronage is allocated in the form of cash and 
qualified written notices of allocation to members . 
b) all of the patronage refunds are allocated to 
members in the form of nonqualified written notices of alloca-
tion. 
3) To document short run impacts of distributing a net 
operating loss and the effects on both the financial structure 
of a cooperative and the net cash flow to its members (by tax 
brackets). 
4) To examine the impact of selected earnings distribu -
tion policie s on th e ability to retire qualified allocated 
equities . 
5) To evaluate the overall economic implications 
associated with the different meth ods of distributing earnings 
analyzed . 
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Procedure of the study 
Chapter 2 is a discussion of the analytical framework 
used in this study. It includes a descripti on of the case 
cooperatives used in the analysis. A description of the simu -
lation models and the procedure that was used to set up the 
alternative tests are also presented. 
The focus of Chapters 3 and 4 is centered on the distri-
bution of earnings to members with the emphasis on net member 
benefits. The base data used for the 10 year projection are 
given. In Chapter 3, the two primar y methods of calculating 
taxable income are presented: ( 1) rapid-ACRS; and 
(2) straight-1 ine depreciation as allowed under ERTA 
(ACRS -SL). In Chapter 4, the allocation of net earnings using 
qualified and nonqualified equities is examined. Analyses 
using the methods then follow in both chapters with emphasis 
on the following items: (1) differences in taxes paid by 
members, the cooperative itself and the total taxes paid by 
both the members and the cooperative; (2) differen ces in 
working capital for the cooperative; and (3) differences in 
member net cash flow and noncash equity distributi ons (by tax 
bracket). 
Chapter 5 is an analysi s of alternative means that may 
be employed by local coo peratives for handling net operating 
losses. Three alternatives for handling losses sourced at 
either the regional cooperative level or the local cooperative 
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level are examined. Its focus is primarily on the after-tax 
cash flow position of the members that resulted from distribu-
ting the losses using the three methods and the financial 
position of the cooperative. 
Chapter 6 is a summary of the study. Conclusions from 
the study and their implications on cooperatives and members 
are given. Recommendations for further research ·follow . 
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CHAPTER 2. METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
The purposes of this chapter are to provide methodolog-
ical background, to present the simulation model used and to 
outline the assumptions made. Selected terms which are unique 
to cooperatives and to this study are defined in Appendi x A 
along with definitions for key terms used in the analysis. 
The Role of the Model 
A cooperative financial simulation model was used to 
analyze earnings distribution patterns. The model used actual 
cooperative financial statements as input and generated pr o-
jected financial statements for the future. The structure of 
the model allowed the selection and simulation of different 
financial strategies with respect to depreciation, earnings 
distribution, equity retirement and fi xed asset acquisition. 
Starting with the current financial position of the coopera -
tive the model was used to generate statements for ten years 
into the future. Hence, the model allowed examination of 
simulated changes that occurred in cooperative cash flow, 
cooperative ta x liab i lity, member cash flow, member tax 
liability and other variables. 
Throughout the study, variables that were not the major 
focus of the study were held constant in the projections. 
Pricing strategy and investment decisions of the cooperatives 
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were held constant at levels that the management predicted for 
the next 10 years. The variables in the study were therefore 
limited to the following: (1) depreciation; (2) distribution 
of earnings; and (3) distribution of losses. 
The variables were evaluated based on the following 
criteria: 
1 ) Working capital - Building working capital is 
important to a cooperative's financial well-bein g . Working 
capital is the result of all the financial transactions that 
occur in a cooperative . Uses of wor king capital in a coopera -
tive are primarily interest expense, cash patronage, federal 
and stat e taxes and equity retirement. If a cooperative do e s 
not maintain an adequate amount of working capital, it will 
need to borrow additional funds. Lenders are frequently 
concerned if working capital becomes very low or negative. 
2) Total member and corporate tax liability - Since th e 
cooperative is an extension of the farm business, the ta xes 
that members must pay on their distribution is a concern as is 
the tax liability at the cooperative level. Different method s 
of distributing earnings result in shi ft ing the incidence of 
the ta x between the cooperative and the members. I n the 
study, the t ota l of the two ta x liabilities was examined in 
order to determine when the taxes were minimized. 
3 ) Equities - Gro wth in equities is important for a 
coo perative. Equity is need ed to maintain and expand 
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operations . When equity is not available, cooperatives need 
to borrow funds. The balance between debt and equity is 
important to lenders since the debt to equity ratio is an 
indicatio n of the sol vency of a cooperati ve. The ability of 
the cooperative t o borrow added fu nds may hinge on its ability 
to generate added equity . 
4) Capital surplus - Capital surplus is maintained to 
reduce pressure on the cooperative to provide funds to meet 
unexpected financial demands. In particular, capital surplus 
can be used to facilitate equity redemption and shorten 
revolving periods . Lenders view capital surplus as a more 
prominent form of equity since it need not be revolved . 
5) Net cas h f l ow - Net cas h flow is examined because it 
is an indication of fairness to members . Cooperatives have 
members in all tax brackets, therefore, distribution policies 
should be as fair and acceptable to all members as possib l e . 
The level of cash patronage is often not high enough to cover 
the tax liability of the equity distribution for members in 
the upper tax brackets . Therefore, they are left with 
negative net cash flow while members in lower tax brackets 
enjoy positive net cash flow from the cooperative. Beyond the 
question of fairness, a negative cash flow may discourage the 
large volume producer from patronizing the cooperative . 
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Depreciation expense calculation 
The model was programmed in accordance with the present 
tax laws concerning depreciation. Two acceptable methods for 
a cooperative to depreciate fixed assets according to the ERTA 
1981 are Rapid - ACRS and ACRS straight-line (ACRS -SL ) . 
Rapid-ACRS is a system for recovering the cost of 
property over periods that are generally much shorter than the 
useful life of the property. In this way, it is similar to 
other methods that have been used in the past. For example, 
sum of years digits and double declining balance depreciation 
had be en used prior to ERTA 1981 to recover cash flow from 
depreciation more rapidly. 
Rapid-ACRS was computed in the following way. The amount 
that was to be recovered under ACRS was the basis of the 
property as determin ed for the purposes of computing gain or 
loss. That is, it was unadjusted for depreciation, amortiza-
tion or depletion. A judgement was then made as to the class 
of property to which the asset belonged. To calculate the 
ACRS allowance f or an asset, the basis of the asset was multi-
plied by the appropriate recovery percentage as provided in 
the tax code for each year that the property was in service 
[62]. 
All additions to fixed assets in the study were consid-
ered to be section 1245 recovery property placed in service 
after 1980. Section 1245 property includes in particular, 
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special purpose storage facilities of the type that are used 
by cooperatives for storing grain. It generally includes all 
recovery property that is eligible for investment ta x credit 
except for certain categories of 15-year real property [34]. 
The cost (basis) of ACRS property is generally recoverable in 
3, 5, 10 or 15 years. Most qualifying section 1245 personal 
property is classified as 5-year property [62]. Hence, the 
assumption was made that most additions to fi xed assets would 
be eligible for ITC and would be depreciable as 5- year 
recovery property under the ACRS system. 
Computer simulations that used rapid-ACRS to calculate 
net earnings were referred to as TAX . This designati on was 
chosen to imply that earnings were calculated using the most 
rapid depreciation allowed in the tax code. 
Some taxpayers may prefer a slower recovery met ho d; 
therefore, they may elect a straight-line re covery method. 
The periods for various classes of property may be chosen in 
accordance with the time periods shown in Table 2 .1.l 
Except for 15-year property, a ta xpayer may not select to 
place different items in a property class under different 
depreciation schedules in any given year. An election to use 
1 
It should be noted that the ACRS-SL for many properties 
are shorter than useful life periods prescribed in Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles. 
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Table 2.1 Recovery periods by property classa 
3-year property 
5-year property 
10-year property 
15-year real property 
15-year publ i c utility property 
asource: [62]. 
3, 5, or 12 years 
5, 12, or 25 years 
10, 25, or 35 years 
15, 35, or 45 years 
15, 35, or 45 years 
either rapid-ACRS or ACRS-SL must apply to all property of the 
same class placed in service in the same year. For property 
other than 15-year property, the half-year convention applies 
[62]. The half-year convention was used in the model when the 
cooperative financial statements were simulate d using the 
straight-line method. All com put er runs that calculated net 
ea rning s by using ACRS-SL were referred to as COMPANY . This 
designation was used to imply that earnings were calculated 
using the slo wer straight-line ACRS depreciation. 
Depreciation on existing fixed assets was calculated 
based on the percent of existing assets that had been taken 
as depreciation expense in the most recent year end audit. As 
fixed assets were added during the projection period, they 
were kept in separate groups. Each group was depreciated 
indi vidually according to their classification as 3- year, 
5-year, 10-year or 15-year property . Total depreciation was a 
sum of the ACRS-SL or rapid depreciation calculated for each 
asset or classification plus the depreciation expense 
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generated by the assets existing prior to the first projection 
year. 
Social security tax calculation 
Most members are required to pay social security taxes on 
their cooperative earnings allocation as self-employed 
persons.2 It was assumed that the tax was paid by · all 
members receiving patronage in the lower tax brackets. The 
self-employment tax was calculated at a flat rate up to a 
specified maximum income . Members who earned the ma ximum 
income base or above from self-employment are not required to 
pay additional social security taxes from their allocation. 
Hence, members whose tax bracket showed that their income 
level was above the maximum income base were not assumed to 
have a self-employment tax liability. Table 2.2 gives the 
self - employment ta x rates as calculated in the model. Table 
2 . 3 gives the maximum wage bases for the tax on self-
employment income as programmed in the model. 
The model was programmed to charge soc ial security (self-
employment tax) only on the portion of distributions made to 
patrons with marginal t ax brackets below the maximum income 
base . The rates shown in Table 2. 2 and the maximum incomes 
shown in Table 2 . 3 were used for all projections except those 
involving operating losses. 
2La ndlords not self-employed are a notable exception. 
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Table 2.2 The percent tax on self-employment income taxa 
Year 
1982-84 
1985 
1986 
asource: [34] . 
Ta x rate on net 
farm income 
9.35 
9.90 
10.00 
Table 2 . 3 a Maximum income base on self-employment income tax 
Year 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
asour ce: [35]. 
Investment tax credit 
Wage base 
32,40 0 
35,700 
37,800 
40, 200 
42 ,300 
44, 700 
Maximum ta x 
3,0 29 
3,338 
3,534 
3,979 
4,230 
4,470 
The model also included investment ta x cred i t prov i sions 
(ITC) as des c ribed under the Ta x Equity and Fisca l 
Responsibility Act of 1982 ( TEFRA-1982 ). TEFRA-19 82 r equires 
the reductio n of the basi s of assets by 50 percent of the 
amount of both regular, energy and certif i ed histor ic 
structure inve s tment ta x credit . The re s u l t of thi s is that 
as sets are no l onger fully depreciab l e [20 ]. 
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Excess investment tax credit not used by the cooperative 
was passed to members. According to current interpretations 
of the tax law, available IT C must be used to defray tax 
liabilities within the cooperative first. Thus, the coopera-
tive must use as much of the ITC as possible to pay corporate 
taxes. After the first $25,000 of ITC the cooperat i ve can 
only apply 85 percent of the remainder toward ta xes. The 
model was programmed to pass the remainder on to the members. 
A cooperative is not allowed to carry-forward or carry-back -
ward any unused ITC. Thus, all ITC wa s assumed to be either 
used by the cooperative or passed to members in the year 
earned. 
Treatment of allocated equities and div i dends 
A qualified allocation was defined in the model as a 
patronage refund that the cooperative c an deduct from its 
taxable income and which the member agree s to add to his/he r 
ta xable income as if received in cash. At least 20 percent of 
a qualified patronage refund allocation must be pa i d t o t he 
member in cash. The thought behind this cash allocation is 
that the member will have c ash flow t o meet the ta x 
liability. 
A nonqualified allocation was defined as a noncash 
patronage refund allocation wher e the patron recei ved a 
written notice that the refund had been i s s ued by the board. 
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This kind of allocation was included in the taxable income of 
the cooperative. When a nonqualified allocation is redeemed 
in cash, the cooperative may deduct the allocation from i t s 
taxable income. Upon receipt of the cash from the redemption, 
the member must recognize the amount received and add it int o 
his taxable income. The analysis did not in cl ude redempt i on 
of nonqualified allocated equity. 
Dividends were paid to members on preferred st ock. Th e 
model only allowed the operat or t o submit a before-ta x div i-
dend rate, despite the fact that di vi dends are paid on an 
after-tax basis . In the simulation of qualified 
distributions, the before and after-tax dividend rates are 
generally the same. Because the cooperative pays on l y a 
minimum amount of taxes ( if any ) when qualified all oc at ions 
are distributed, differences were ex tremely sma l l. 
A problem arose when nonqualified a l locat i ons were made. 
Since the cooperative general l y pays a large r amount of ta xe s , 
the after-tax dividend rate was usuall y smal l er than t he 
bef ore-tax rate. The end result was that in qualified and 
nonqualified runs the amount of dividend s paid was sli ght ly 
different. However, comparison s over the ten year proje c ti on 
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period indicated that the absolute amount of these differences 
were small and did not materially affect the results. 3 
Member tax bracket distributions 
Coo pera tive members hav e a wid e variety of income levels. 
This creates a problem in analyzing tax impacts of earnings 
passed to members. An attempt was made to simulate several 
possible membership distributions on the basis of the highest 
marginal income t ax brackets. Table 2.4 shows the five 
statistical income tax bracket scenarios that were assumed in 
this study . Scenario 1 was a quasi-normal distribution of 
members such that the average tax bracket of the membership 
wa s centered around the 20 percent tax bracket. Marginal 
member tax brackets range from 11 to 50 percent by increments 
of three percent . In scenario 1, three percent of the member-
ships were assumed to fall in the 11 percent bracket, 10 per-
cent were assumed to fall into the 14 percent tax bracket, and 
so on . Scenario 2 was centered around the 25 percent marginal 
tax bracket, scenario 3 was centered around the 30 percent 
marginal tax bracket, scenario 4 was ce ntered around the 35 
3The India na cooperative paid dividends but al so 
retired preferred stock . After the se venth year, all the 
preferred stock had been retired. The total difference in 
dividends paid over the 10 years between the qualif ied TAX and 
nonqualified TAX run s was $18,755 and the difference between 
the COMPA!!..1. runs wa s $22,222 . The eastern poultry cooperative 
also paid dividends . The difference i n the TAX runs was 
$59,625 and the differen ce in the CO MPANY runs-was $77,836 . 
In all cases the difference wa s less than one percent of total 
working capital . 
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percent marginal tax bracket, and scenario 5 was centered 
around the 40 percent marginal tax bracket. 
Total net earnings in period t in the cooperative was 
defined as operating income less operating expenses plus 
regional patronage. 
NEt = (Oit-O Et) + RPt. 
t = period, 
NEt = Net earnings, 
Olt = Operating income, 
OEt = Operating expenses, and 
RPt = Regional patronage received. 
Working capital in period t was defined as the working 
capital from the previous period plus net earnings in period t 
less regional patronage plus depreciation expense plus 
regional participation in equity retirement plus sales of 
assets plus term notes from the bank plus net replacement of 
allocated equities, less payment on term notes less cash 
patronage less state and federal corporate taxes less 
additions to fixed assets less settlement of estates less 
equity retirement. 
wet = wct-1 + [NEt-RPt+DEt] + RERt + SAt + TNt + NRt 
- PTNt - CPt - Tt - AFt - Et - ERt. 
t = period, 
WC t = Working capital i n period t , 
WC t-1 = Working capital i n period ·t -1' 
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NEt = Net earnings, 
RPt = Regional patronage, 
DEt = Depreciation expense, 
RERt = Regional participation in equity retirement, 
SAt = Sale on fixed assets, 
TN = Term notes, 
NRt = Net replacement of allocated equities, 4 
PTNt = Payment on term note, 
CPt = Cash patronage, 
Tt = State and federal taxes, 
Aft = Additions to fixed assets, 
Et = Settlement of estates, and 
ERt = Equity retirement. 
Net cash flow to members in period t was defined as the 
ITC plus cash patronage minus the tax liability of the total 
patronage plus dividends less the tax liability of the 
dividends. 
NCFt = ITCt + ct - Pt(tp + st) + Ot[l-(tp + st)]. 
t = period, 
NCFt = Net cash flow, 
IT Ct = Investment tax credit, 
4Net replacement of allocated equities was used as a 
balancing account in the model. The model assumed that 
differences in the retirement of estates and the reduction in 
allocated equities wa s accounted for by increases in various 
equity accounts. 
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ct = Cash patronage, 
pt = Total patronage, 
tp = Personal marginal ta x rate, 
Dt = Dividends, and 
st = Social security tax rate. 
Total member and cooperative tax liability when qualified 
allocations were distributed in period t was defined as the 
total tax liability on the qualified allocation to members for 
both federal and social security taxes plus the tax liability 
on members dividends plus the tax liability on the additions 
to ca pita l surplus less ITC. 
Total member and cooperative tax liability, when 
nonqualified allocations were distributed in period t, was 
defined as the total tax liability to the cooperative on the 
net earnings plus the member tax liability on dividends less 
ITC used by the cooperative to offset taxes. 
TTNQ = (NE) (tc) + D(tp +st) - ITCC. 
t t 
TTQ =Total member and cooperative tax liability 
t on a qualified allocation, 
TTNQ =Total member and cooperative tax liability , 
t on a nonqualified allocation, 
TQt =Total qualified allocatio n, 
Dt = Dividends, 
CSt = Additions to capital surplus, 
NEt 
tp 
tc 
St 
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= Net earnings, 
= Personal marginal tax rate, 
= Corporate federal ta x rate, 
= Social security tax rate, and 
= Investment tax credit used by the 
cooperat iv e . 
Value s ( working capital, net ca s h flow, tota l taxes) have 
been compounded throughout the study in order to compare the 
time-value benefits which result from using different methods 
of distributing earnings. 
The Case Co operative s 
Unqua l i fied opinion aud its for 1980 and 198 1 from f our 
cooperatives su ppl ied the base data for the s imu la tio n analy -
s is. The cooperatives studied i nc lud e: ( 1 ) a smal l local 
co operat i ve in we stern Nebraska; (2) a local coo pe rat i ve in 
central Iowa; ( 3 ) a l oc al cooperative in Indiana; and ( 4) a 
large marketing and proc ess ing cooperative in t he eastern U. S. 
Each was selected to repr ese nt a different type of coopera -
tive. It was considered desirable t o determine how (and 
whether ) different methods used to distribute earnings to 
members would affect coo peratives of different types , loca -
tions and sizes. 
The small coo perative in Nebraska was primarily i nvolved 
in handling wheat. In 19 80, near l y 100 percent of the t ota l 
sales wa s from whe at and ot her minor sma l l grains . Net local 
28 
savings in 1980 was $74,733. The cooperative had $773 , 241 in 
total assets with a current ratio of 3.19 to 1 and $7,943 in 
working capital. 
The medium-sized local gra in and supply coop erative in 
Iowa was also primarily a grain cooperative . The grain 
department accounted for almost 81 percent of total sales in 
1980. The major grain marketed through the cooperative was 
corn. Its current ratio in 1980 was substantially lo wer than 
the Nebraska small grain cooperative at 1.19 to 1. Wor king 
capital was $380,736 and combined net local savings and 
regional patronage refunds for distribution was $405,397. 
The large local cooperative in Indiana was involved in 
both supplies and grain marketing. However, its sales from 
farm supplies accounted for almost 60 percent of total sales . 
In view of the fact that grain marketing activity generates 
larger dollar sales than supplies, its primary activity was 
clearly supplies. In 1980, the cooperative generated t otal 
earnings for distribution amounting to $471,265. The 
cooperative had $1,984,107 in working capital with a current 
ratio of 1.87 to 1. 
The eastern mar keti ng and pro cessing cooperative was 
primarily involved in feed manufacturing and in processing and 
marketing poultry products. In 1980, sales fro m poultry 
marketing were $78,834,197. Local earnings for 1980 were 
$655,570. The cooperative had $10,057,566 in working capital 
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and their current ratio was strong at 3 .04. Comparat i ve data 
for the cooperatives are in Table 2.5. 
Data were taken from the actual balance sheets, operating 
statements, statements of member equitie s and other supple -
mental data schedules provided by the audits and by the 
management of the case cooperatives. All of the data entered 
after the base data we~e projection alternatives for the coop-
eratives. In this study, the projections were based on 
changes in either the balance sheet or the operating 
statement. For example, in the second year it coul d be 
projected that grain volume would fall by one percent because 
of expected market conditions. 
The results obtained from submitting new projection 
alternatives for the next period were shown on a computer 
print - out . The data are given in the following order: 
(1) operating statement; (2) balance sheet; ( 3 ) statement of 
changes in working capital; ( 4) changes in components of 
working cap ital ; (5) investment tax credit section; ( 6 ) cash 
and noncash distribution of member equity; (7) financial 
impact on members by incremental tax rate in tabular form; 
( 8) distribution of farmer, federal, social security and total 
ta x liability given five scenarios, in table for m; and 
(9) corporate federal and state taxes due. 
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Table 2.5 Comparative data: 1980a 
Iowa Eastern 
Nebr ask a marketing Indiana poultry 
grain and SUEEl.l'. SUEEl.l'. marketing 
Current assets 283,967 2,420 ,156 4,274,857 14,982,875 
Fixed assets 392,376 1,269,594 1,688,662 8, 677, 200 
Total assets 773 '241 4,604,544 8,166,460 24,709,474 
Current liabilities 88,955 2,039,420 2,290,749 4,925,309 
Long term liabilities 146,250 602,007 727 ,819 4, 06 7' 748 
Total liabilities 135,205 2,641,427 3,018,569 8,993,057 
Qualified equities 143,138b 1,450,451 4,005,046 15,262,742 
Unallocated capital 
surplus 70,730 313,736 784,629 0 
Tota 1 equities 773,241 1,963,114 5,147,891 24,709,474 
Current ratio CA/CL 3 .19 1.19 1. 87 3.04 
Debt/equity ratioc .27 . 30 .14 .26 
Working capital 195,012 380,736 1, 984, 107 10,057,566 
Local savings 69,124 254,335 353,660 655,570 
Regional patronage 5,609 115,062 117,604 
Net savings 
(combined) 74, 733 405,397 471, 265 655,570 
asource: Audits 1980. 
brn 1981 they transferred 
equities. 
$244,500 common stock to qualified 
cTotal long-term liability/member equity. 
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Summary 
This chapter outlined the model and described the coop-
erative goal of maximizing net member benefits. It was 
intended to establish a framework to provide background 
information on the four useful purposes for this study: 
1) the examination of the impacts on earnings of the new 
depreciation laws; 
2) the comparison of different methods of distributing 
earnings in light of the current tax law and legal decisions; 
3) the evaluation and prediction of the impact at the 
local cooperative level and on local cooperative members of 
three methods of treating net operating losses; and 
4) the provision of information and the clarification of 
important issues confronting the financial decision-makers at 
the local cooperative level. 
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CHAPTER 3. DEPRECIATION 
Introduction 
This chapter shows the results of using rapid-ACRS (TAX) 
and ACRS-SL (CO MPANY) to calculate net earnings . The implica-
tions that each method has on maximizing net cash flow to 
members are also discussed. 
Methods of Calculating and Distributing Earnings 
Three of the four cooperatives were used for this portion 
of the study. The base data for Indiana, Iowa, and the 
eastern marketing and processing cooperative are shown jn the 
following section . Eight primary situations were examined for 
all the cooperatives. Four secondary situations were included 
to examine the effects on earnings distribution if Book -t o-ta x 
(Book -to-tax is explained on the following page) statements 
were used . The last set of situations examined the impacts 
when qualified equities were retired . The situations were as 
follows: 
SITUATION 1. The cooperative allocated qualified 
equities and paid 30 percent in cash patronage to the members . 
The earnings were calculated on a COMPANY basis and there was 
no equity retired . 
SITUATION 2 . Situation 2 is the same as situation 1 
except that earnings were calcu la ted on a TAX bas i s . 
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SITUATION 3. The cooperative allocated qualified equi-
ties and paid 40 percent cash patronage to the members. The 
earnings were calculated on a COMPANY basis and no equity was 
retired. 
SITUATION 4. Situation 4 is the same as situation 3 
except that earnings were calculated on a TAX basis . 
SITUATION 5. The cooperative allocated qualified 
equities and paid 45 percent in cash patronage to their 
members. The earnings were calculated on a COMPANY basis and 
no equity was retired. 
SITUATION 6 . Situation 6 is the same as situation 5 
except that earnings were calculated on a TAX basis . 
SITUATION 7. The cooperative allocated nonqualified 
equities and paid no cash patronage to the members. The 
earnings were calculated on a COMPANY basis and there was no 
equity retired. 
SITUATION 8. Situation 8 is the same as situation 7 
except that earnings were calculated on a TAX basis. 
The second set of situations were the same as situations 
1, 3, 5, and 7 except that the Book-to - Tax (BTT) system of 
accou nting was used. The function of BTT accounting in this 
stu dy was the reconciliation of the balance sheets when taxes 
we re calculated on rapid depreciation earnings and earnings 
were distributed on book depreciation. The BTT system allows 
the cooperative to reconcile net earnings calculated for tax 
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purposes by using rapid-ACRS, while earnings calculated for 
distribution are calculated by using ACRS-SL. The difference 
between the TAX depreciation expense and the COMPANY deprecia-
tion expense was recorded in the equity section of the balance 
sheet in an ACRS reserve account. 
In the early years of the life of an asset, the ACRS 
reserve account accumulated a large negati ve balance due to 
deferred taxes. The account was offset by a corresponding 
increase in allocated equities and capital surplus. The ratio 
used was 90 percent to allocated equity and 10 percent to 
unallocated capital surplus . After the accelerated deprecia-
tion period, the ACRS reserve account decrea sed in absolute 
value slowly. In the early years, the amount of extra 
permanent equity that was generated was substantial. 
Indiana were used for these runs. 
Iowa and 
The last set of situations only involved the Iowa cooper -
ative. Situations 2, 6, and 8 were simulated again. In these 
simulations, the assumption was made that there was retirement 
of qualified allocated equity from previous years . Equity was 
retired based on four percent of the total pool of qualified 
allocated equities each year. 
Base data - Indiana 
The gross margin in the supply depar tme nt for the base 
year was 14.71~ (Table 3.1). For the 10 projection years, the 
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Tab le 3 .1 Base data - Indiana cooperative 
Supplies Marketing $ Gross margins 
Sales GM/ Sales GM/ 
Year volume unit volume unit Supplies Marketing 
1 18,026,992 .139 13,049,051 .018 2,505,751 234,883 
2 18, 207' 248 .140 13,179,532 .019 2, 549,014 250 '411 
3 18,389,296 .140 13,311,317 .019 2,574,501 252,915 
4 18,573,168 .141 13,444,420 .020 2,618,816 268,888 
5 18,758,880 .141 13,578,854 .020 2,645,001 271,577 
6 18,946,448 .142 13,714,632 .021 2,690,394 288,007 
7 19,135,888 .139 13,851, 768 .019 2,659,888 263,184 
8 19,327,232 .140 13,990,275 .021 2,705 ,812 293 ,796 
9 19,520,480 .141 14,130,167 .022 2,752,387 310,864 
10 19,715,664 .140 14,271,458 .021 2,760,192 299' 701 
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gross margin was held fairly constant; minor fluctuations in 
margins were allowed in a range from 13.93~ to 14.2~. In the 
grain marketing department, the base year gross marg in was set 
at 1.76 percent of grain sales. Over the projectio n years it 
was increased slightly with moderate fluctuations. The 199 1 
projection was 2.1 percent. The volume of products mar ke t ed 
was down 7.88 percent in the base year; then it increased by 
12.27 percent in the first projection year with one percent 
increases each year thereafter. The pattern reflected the 
decrease in the volume of grain on the market late last year 
and the expectatio n of the manager for volume in t he future . 
Other income accounts were projected to grow throughout 
the 10 years. Grinding and grain proces s ing were increased by 
two percent each year. The service income increased by one 
percent each year. The expense accounts, salaries, other 
expenses, and fixed expense all increa sed two percent each 
year to reflect expected inflation. Regional patronage was 
varied from a low of $50,000 in the eighth period t o a high of 
$155,000 in the sixth period with the remaining years falling 
between these extremes . The cash portion f rom the regiona l 
cooperative was held constant at 30 per ce nt for the 10 years 
projected. 
In the third and fourth peri ods , there were additions t o 
fixed assets ( including the normal replacement of fi xe6 
assets ) in the amounts $365,000 and $450,000 respective ly. I n 
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the other years, normal replacement ranged from $200,000 to 
$320,000. ACRS - SL depreciation wa s calcula ted on a 10 year 
life for all fixed assets . Using rapid-ACRS, a five year life 
was selected . In the first five years, none of the assets 
were fina nced using debt but in the last five years debt was 
used to finance from 60 to 78 percent of the additions t o 
fixed assets. 
Base data - Iowa 
The gross margins for corn i n the base year wa s 8.84~ 
(Table 3.2) . It wa s projected to fall to 8.5 ~ in the second 
year and then rise steadily to 9.2~ in the last year. The 
gross margins on bean s wa s set at 11.46~ in the base year and 
wa s increased steadily to 13 . 8~ i n the tenth year. 
In the supply department, the gross margins on fertilizer 
was 16.48~ in the base year and climbed to 18.0~ in the last 
projection year. The pr ojected volume of corn marketed i n the 
base year and the fifth year wa s down 19.92 and 15 . 0 percent, 
respe c tively. In the sixth year, volume was projected to 
increase by 16 per cent and in every other year volume was 
increased by one percent. 
The volume of beans marketed refle cted the same pattern, 
do wn by 2 .09 percent in the base year and down 10 percent in 
the fifth year. The sixth year volume was increa se d by 11 
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percent and in every other year volume was increased by one 
percent. 
The volume of fertilizer sold showed little fluctuation 
over the 10 years. The three years of lower volumes were to 
simulate a few recent bad years that the Iowa cooperative had 
encountered during the past decade as a direct result of 
weather variability. Other income accounts were projected to 
remain relatively stable for the 10 years except for storage. 
It was projected to follow the same pattern as the volume of 
corn and beans. In the base year and in the f i fth year, the 
volume fell by 16.15 and 15 percent, respectively. The 
expense accounts were projected to increase by five percent 
each year. 
The regional patronage that the Iowa cooperative was 
projected to receive from its patronage with several regional 
cooperatives fell in a range between $60,000 and $225,000. 
The percent of the patronage that was paid in cash was held 
constant at 35 percent. 
Additions to fixed assets were greatest in the second 
year at $525,000. In the other years it fell in a range from 
$25,000 to· $30,000 for normal fixed asset replacements. The 
cooperative financed almost all of the additions to fixed 
assets by using debt. 
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Base data - eastern marketing and processing cooperative 
The gross margins on processing and marketing activities 
in the base year was 7.67~ per dollar of volume (Table 3.3). 
The gross margins were projected to increase over the 10 years 
with a decline in the seventh and tenth years. The volume of 
poultry for market was projected to rise three percent each 
year except in the eighth year when volume was projected to 
fall by. 10 percent. 
Other income accounts were projected to grow at a rate of 
two percent per year. The expense accounts were allowed to 
increase by four percent each year. The regional patronage 
that the cooperative received ranged from $250,000 in year 
three to $75,000 in year eight. The cash portion of patronage 
from the regional was projected to be 30 percent each year. 
The eastern cooperative was projected to make heavy 
investment in fixed assets over the entire 10-year period. 
The high was $3,000,000 of additions to fixed assets in year 
seven. In the other years, the investments were never less 
than $2,000,000. The cooperative primarily financed the 
additional fixed asset investments through debt. 
Comparison of Rapid-ACRS and ACRS-SL Depreciation 
As cooperatives grow, net fixed assets enter in coopera -
tive balance sheets when they are purchased. As the assets 
41 
Tab le 3. 3 Base data - Eastern cooperative 
Poultr~ marketing 
Sa les GM/ 
Year volume unit $ Gross margins 
($) ($) ($) 
1 79,622,464 .08 6,369,795 
2 81,214,864 .10 8,121,483 
3 83,839,120 .11 9,112,299 
4 85,324,256 . 12 10, 238, 906 
5 87,883,952 .13 11,424,913 
6 90,520,432 .14 12,672,859 
7 92, 236,016 .105 9,789,777 
8 83,912,400 .15 12,586,857 
9 92,303,584 .14 12 ,922,500 
10 95,072,656 .135 12,834,807 
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are used, they begin to lose value. Traditionally fixed 
assets have been valued and depreciated according to their 
useful life. U. S. tax codes allowed the use of more rapid 
methods such as double declining balance and sum of years 
digits. Si nc e the passage of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 
1981, assets can be depreciated even more quickly. 
The ERTA-1981 depreciation schedules allow for faster 
recovery of fixed asset costs through depreciation than 
previous methods of accumulating depreciation . Coo perativ es 
(un~er ERTA) may choose to use the rapid accelerated cost 
recovery system (ACRS) or they can use a specified straight 
line method of recovery system (ACRS-SL). Both the ACRS and 
the s tra ight -line methods allowable under ERTA offer a faster 
recovery system than the straight-line methods permitted in 
the past under the old Asset Depreciation Range guide l ine s . 
The system a cooperat ive chooses to use in depreciating 
its assets will affect the operating statement . In some 
cooperatives, depreciation expense is a large portion of total 
expenses . Net earnings fluctuate depending on the magnitude 
of depreciation expense. This occurs because net earnings are 
calculated by subtracting total operating expenses from total 
operating income . 
Depreciation is a noncash expense. Thus , cash does not 
flow from the cooperative as a direct result of depreciation 
expense . It is a valid expense because existing assets are 
43 
declining in value (due to their use in the operation of the 
cooperative). Nonetheless, there is no check written for 
depreciation expense. Therefore, rapi d depreciation will 
reduce taxable income in early years but it will not reduce 
cash flow, all else equal. In later years, (without addi-
tional investment) taxes will increase and cash will flow from 
the firm as a result. 
Table 3.4 gives the dollar amount of additions to fixed 
assets in each year. The Indiana cooperative has a fairly 
constant investment stream with hea vier investments in years 
three and four. The Iowa cooperative invested in an e l e vator 
in year two valued at $525,000. However, in the other nine 
years only small additions to assets (for normal replacement ) 
were made. The eastern cooperative invested from $2 -3 ,000,000 
each year for growth and replacement. 
The three investment streams were depreciated by using 
both rapid-ACRS ( hereafter called TAX) and ACRS-SL (hereafter 
called COMPANY). The pattern of depreciation expense that 
resulted from the two methods can be seen in Figures 3.1 
through 3 . 3. 
It is evident from the graphs that the level of invest-
ments in fixed assets and the timing of investments had a 
significant impact on depreciation expen se. The TAX line is 
above the COMPANY line in every year except 1991 for the 
Indiana cooperative ( Figure 3 .1 ). The investments were large 
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Table 3.4 Additions to fixed assets 
Year Indiana Iowa Eastern 
1 200,000 55,000 2,000,000 
2 220 ,000 525,000 2,000,000 
3 365,000 25,000 2,000,000 
4 450,000 30,000 2,500,000 
5 320,000 25,000 2,500,000 
6 250,000 30,000 2,500,000 
7 225,000 25,000 3,000,000 
8 200,000 30,000 2,500,000 
9 275,000 25,000 2,000,000 
10 250,000 30,000 2,000,000 
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enough in the earlier years to spread the benefit of increased 
depreciation expense over the l ater years . 
For the Iowa cooperative, the TA X line fe ll below the 
COMPANY line in 1988 and thereafter (Figure 3 . 2) . The eleva -
tor fi xed assets were classified as 5-year property; there -
fore, after the fifth year the cost of the asset had been 
fully recovered. The investments in later years were not 
large enough to keep the TAX line above the COMPANY line . 
This result occurred partly because the COMPANY line was still 
reflecti ng the depreciation from the elevator i nvest ment, 
while the TA X line was reflecting the elevator as fully 
depreciated. 
The eastern marketing cooperative's investments were 
consistently large enough to keep the TA X line above the 
COMPANY line for all 10 years (Figure 3.3). The cooperative 
was able to take advantage of the greater depreciation expense 
that resulted from using rapid-ACRS . Despite the early 
divergence between TAX and COMPANY, the lines tended to 
converge after 10 years of heavy investment and its cumulative 
affects on both de preciation schedules. The distance between 
the curves represent s extra cas h flow generated for the 
cooperative by rapid - ACRS depreciation when the TAX line is 
above the COMPANY line . The oposite is true when the COMPANY 
line is above the TAX line. 
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Net earnings 
Depreciation was an integral expense e lem ent in the 
operating statement, therefore the me thod used t o calculate 
depre cia tion affected net earnings. Table 3. 5 gives the net 
earnings for the three cooperatives usi ng both rapid - ACRS 
(TAX) and ACRS-SL (COMPANY). During the years that depre cia -
ti on under rapid-ACRS was taken, the earni ngs were artifi -
c ial ly low . In Figure s 3.4-3.5, the COMPANY line fell below 
the TAX line until the year 1988 in th e Iowa cooperative and 
i n year 1990 in the Indiana cooperative. At thi s point, the 
COMPANY earning s were le ss due to the co nt inued straight - line 
depreciation and a r edu c tion in th e rapid-ACRS depreciation. 
In the eastern cooperative, the ea rning s are always less 
by us ing rapid-ACRS than by using ACRS-SL (Fig ur e 3.6) . The 
distance between the TA X line and t he COMPANY line represents 
differences in taxable in come. 
Working ca pital 
Adequate working capital is essential for financial 
health in a cooperative. Wo rki ng capital is a key source of 
fund s in the bu siness. Many items compete for the use of 
funds. Loa n payments and fixed assets usually take a large 
portion of available working capital. The quantity of fund s 
ca n a l so be augmented through debt. Howev er , with rapid-ACRS 
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Table 3. 5 Net earnings 
Indiana Iowa Eastern 
Year Tax Company Tax Company Tax Company 
1 318,456 337,456 364, 686 372, 150 (867,970) (677,970 ) 
2 373, 864 417, 564 236,883 308,241 457,256 875, 256 
3 404,540 485,195 285' 910 380,970 905,383 1,532,383 
4 240 '661 368' 911 12,788 95,641 1,235,221 2,118,720 
5 270,006 433,738 274,080 359,641 1,557,087 2, 706,586 
6 230 , 225 379,612 246, 022 329,635 2,512,345 3,524, 095 
7 129,558 258,141 293,133 274,717 (1 ,152,661) (231,161 ) 
8 296 ,783 373,448 274 ,878 256,550 1,235,390 2,028,640 
9 393,354 408,032 309,650 290,081 1,560,402 2,063,904 
10 346' 790 324' 703 279, 316 257,799 1,325,520 1,534,523 
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there may be sufficient working capital generated to finance 
operations without resorting to increased debt load. 
Since depreciation is a noncash expense, it is a source 
of working capital for the cooperative. Larger amounts of 
depreciation expense result in greater amounts of working 
capital. This allows the financing of new assets, retirement 
of equity and other uses of funds from operations. 
Figures 3.7-3.15 show the working capital available to 
each cooperative over the 10 projection years. I n all cases, 
the TAX lines were above the COMPANY lines and the gap between 
the two groups widened in later years. As the cooperative 
increased the cash portion of the qualified distrib ut ion ( i .e . 
40 to 45 percent), the gap also widened. This paradoxical 
result occurred because the cash portion was calculated based 
on the total distribution. The artificially rapid deprecia-
tion made the earnings much smaller in the TA X run than in the 
COMPANY run. 
The difference between the TAX working capital and the 
COMPANY working capital over the 10 years implied that sub-
stantial benefit to the cooperative was possible with 
rapid-ACRS. 
Although it is evident that the coo pera t ive would have 
had larger amounts of working capital under rapid-ACRS 
depreciation, the true impact was understated. The model did 
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not adjust debt financing year to year in accordance with the 
increasing working capital . 
This adjustme nt was not made in order to see direct 
impacts on absolute amounts of working capital . Because of 
the method used, the benefits of added working capital were 
not reflected in terms of lower borrowing or interest earned 
on the extra working capital avai l able through rapid-ACRS 
depreciation . 
In order to ident i fy the value of the extra - wor king 
capital, the annual differences between the TAX working 
capital and COMPANY working cap ital were compounded from the 
time they were earned t o the end of the projection period . 
This provided an indication of the additional time value 
benefits to the cooperative associated with using rapid - ACRS. 
The difference between TAX wor king capital and COMPANY 
working capita l each year was compounded by the appropriate 
future value factor and summed over the 10 years . 1 The 
1 
10 
I [(Twc - e we ) * FV CFi nJ, 
n = 1 ' 
TAX 
WC = tax working capital, = interest rate, 
CO MPANY =company working capital, n =year, we 
FVCF. = 
i , n 
1 
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results of compounding the marginal differences in working 
capital at 10 , 12 and 14 percent are shown in Table 3 . 6 . 
Th e nonqualified portion of the table shows the greatest 
difference in working c ap ital when rapid-ACRS is used instead 
of ACRS-SL . In 10 years, the Iowa cooperative would have at 
least $2,000,000 more in working capita l from using rapid -
ACRS . Even larger amounts resulted in the Indiana and eastern 
marketing and processing cooperative . 
Since the cooperative paid taxes on the entire tax bill 
when nonqualified equities were distributed, the higher 
earning levels that resulted, the greater the corporate tax 
burdens . Therefore, a greater drain on working capital was 
obs erved. The probl em of working capital drain was greatest 
when nonqualified equity growth wa s occurring with no 
revolving . If revolving had been conducted , the deduction 
from the nonqualified equity retired would have reduced the 
drain by reducing federal taxes paid at the cooperative 
level. 
When a qualified distribution was made, the percent of 
allocated earnings paid in cash was a significant factor . At 
higher levels of cash patronage , using the rapid - ACR S ( TAX) 
became more beneficial. Once again, the tota l TAX distribu -
tion was less than the COMPANY total distribution . The larger 
percent cash patronage to be distributed was computed on a 
smaller base earnings in the TAX runs. Thus , the increase i n 
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Table 3. 6 Future value, working capital - tax vs . cornpanya 
Compound 
T~Ee of comEarison rate Iowa Indiana Eastern 
Qualified tax vs. 
qualified company 
45% cash patronage 10% $1,839,120 $2,841,164 $18,933 ,516 
12 2, 004, 723 3,059,441 20 ,352 , 517 
14 2,189,976 3, 304, 106 21,941,418 
Qualif ied tax vs . 
qualified company 
40% cash patronage 10 1,603,825 2,562,143 16,413 ,536 
12 1, 747,643 2, 761 ,098 17 , 630 , 261 
14 1,908,499 2,984 ,289 18 , 992,433 
Qualified tax vs . 
qualified company 
30% cash patronage 10 1,132,076 1, 728 , 773 10,061 , 693 
12 1, 232 , 221 1,862,640 10, 811 , 370 
14 1, 344, 171 2,012 , 720 11, 651 , 43 7 
Nonqua 1 ifi ed tax vs. 
non qua 1 if i ed company 10 2,063 ,052 3,045 , 745 21 , 553 , 504 
12 2, 250 ,442 3,199,912 23 , 198 , 654 
14 2, 460,080 3,507 , 196 27 ,648,656 
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cash payout from rapid-ACRS was lower, relative to the 
increase in cash payout from the ACRS - SL. 
At a level of 30 percent cash patronage payout, the 
difference in wor king capital compounded at 10 percent was 
$10,016,693 in the eastern cooperative, but at a level of 45 
percent cash patronage the amount jumped to $18,933,516. 
This was evident in Figures 3 . 7 to 3 .9. A larger gap 
separated the TAX and COMPANY runs as the cooperative 
increased its cash patronage in each of the case coopera -
tives. 
Total tax liability 
The me thod used to re cover the cost of fixed assets also 
affected both the cooperative tax liability and the member tax 
liability. In order to maximize the net benefits to members, 
the total tax l iabi lity between the cooperative and members 
should be minimized. 
The total taxes were assumed (in the model) to be a 
combination of federal tax l iability of the cooperative, and 
federal tax liability of the members plus the social security 
tax liability of mempers as a direct result of the earnings 
distribution from the cooperative . The state tax liabilities 
for the cooperative and for members were not included due to 
the variability in state taxation across the United States . 
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Figures 3.16-3.20 from the Iowa cooperative, reflect the 
pattern that was seen in all three cooperatives. Each of the 
five graphs shown was computed under a separate tax liability 
scenario . The scenarios differed according to assumptions in 
Chapter 2 about the distribution of member tax brackets . The 
aggregate members 1 tax liability increased as the average 
member ta x bracket in the distribution 11 centered 11 at a higher 
marginal tax rate. 
In general, the TAX lines fell below the COMPANY lines in 
earlier years simply because earnings were less in years under 
the rapid depreciation schedules permitted by ACRS. However, 
in 1983 the nonq ualified COMPANY line fell below the qualified 
TAX line. 
In 1983, the Iowa cooperati ve invested $525,000 in an 
elevator annex for their operations. The investment entitled 
them to $52,000 of investment tax credit. When the coopera -
tive was distributing nonqualified equities, it was possible 
to take advantage of the ITC at the cooperative level . Their 
total tax bill was directly reduced by $48,375. 
Furthermore, after using the available ITC at the 
cooperative level, the remaining $4,125 of ITC was passed on 
to the members. In the case of the qualified TAX distribu -
tion, the cooperative cou·ld use only $3,671 of ITC to reduce 
the corpora te tax bill from the additions to capital surplus . 
The cooperative used $21,083 of the ITC as cash patronage to 
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members and $27,747 was returned to members in addition to the 
patronage. 2 Since members still received the same taxable 
distribution as they would have received without the ITC , only 
$27 ,74 7 of the ITC could be used to offset their total taxes. 
In the later years, 1988-1991, the total tax pattern 
switched in the Iowa cooperativ e. The Iowa cooperative had 
only one large investment (in 1983) . Since the investment was 
classified as Sectio n 1245 5-year property in the TAX run, 
full cost recovery had been accomplished at the end of 1987 . 
In the COMPANY run, the elevator addition was still being 
depreciated. Therefore, depreciation expense was larger and 
earnings were less than the earnings in the TAX runs. Conse -
quently, the lower earnings level resulted in less taxes paid 
under the COMPANY run. 
Examination of the results from the Indiana and eastern 
cooperatives shows that the same patterns were evident in the 
final projection year (see Figures 4.3-4.7 and Appendix 
Figu res B.1-B . 5). The nonqualified COMPA!i...'!'.. line fell below 
the nonqualified TAX line. The higher the average tax bracket 
of the members (i .e. moving from scenario 1 to scenario 5), 
the larger the gaps between the qualified COMP ANY and the 
qualified TAX lines . The pattern wa s evident in all three of 
2under cooperative tax statutes investment tax credits 
may be passed to members in lieu of cash patronage payments if 
the cooperative cannot use them. 
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the cooperatives . This implied that the difference between 
the COMPANY-taxable distribution and the TAX-taxable 
distribution became more important as members' tax liability 
"centered" at higher marginal tax brackets. 
Using rapid-ACRS depreciation had the effect of delaying 
taxes. Thus , the time value of money was measured . Table 3 . 7 
shows future value comparisons of taxes paid between TAX and 
COMPANY runs for selected scenarios. Separate comparisons 
were made under the assumption that a qualified distribution 
was made and under the assumption that a nonqualified 
distribution was made. 
The compounded differences between the qualified 
distributions i ncreased from scenario 1 t o scenario 5 . These 
were calculated by subtracting the COMPANY total taxes paid 
from the TAX total taxes paid each year. The differences were 
then multiplied by the appr opriate future valu e factor 
coef fic ient and the resulting values were summed over the ten 
years . 3 The results indicated that the total tax savings 
3 
10 
I [(TaxTTL - CompanyTTL) * FVCFi,n], 
n=l 
=total tax liability from tax run, 
CompanyTTL = total tax liability from company run, 
n = year , = interest rate , 
FVCF. = 
1 , n 
1 
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Tab le 3. 7 Future value, total member and corporate tax liability -
tax vs. companya 
Compound 
Type of comparison rate Iowa Indiana Eastern 
Qualified tax vs. 
qualified company 
Scenario 1 10% $(214,039 ) $ ( 394 , 125 ) $(3,577,661 ) 
12 ( 246 , 207) (442,199) (3 ,973, 794 ) 
14 (282,534) (492,134) (4,418,147) 
Qualified tax vs. 
qualified company 
Scenario 2 10 (240,265 ) (442 ,345 ) (4,035,304 ) 
12 (276,529) (494,283) (4,483,076 ) 
14 (317,213) (552,355 ) (4, 985, 203 ) 
Qualified tax vs . 
qualified company 
Scenario 5 10 (271,659 ) (501,033 ) (4,587,961 ) 
12 (312 , 796) (559, 941) (5 ,098,629 ) 
14 (358 ,953 ) (625,810 ) ( 5, 6 71 , 348 ) 
Nonqualified tax vs . 
nonqualified comp any 
Scenario 1 10 (269,952 ) ( 637, 341) (4,721,761) 
12 (311,396 ) (712 ,305 ) (5 , 247,931 ) 
14 (379,91 7) (796, 129 ) (5,838 ,029) 
Nonqualified tax vs. 
nonqualified company 
Scenario 2 10 (269,952) (637,178 ) (4,789,753 ) 
12 (311,396 ) (712,121 ) (5,323 ,144) 
14 (379 ,917) ( 795 , 920 ) (5, 921 , 330 ) 
Nonqual ified tax vs . 
nonqua l ified company 
Scenario 5 10 (269,952) ( 636 '967) (5 ,311, 054) 
12 (311,396) ( 711, 881) (5 , 894,643 ) 
14 (379,91 7) ( 790 '326) (6 ,549,625) 
a(TAXTTL - COMP ANY TTL ) . 
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increased as the average tax bracket of members increased in 
all the qualified cases if the cooperatives used rapid-ACRS 
instead of ACRS-SL. 
This was not the case when the cooperative distributed 
nonqualifieds. In the Indiana cooperative, the total tax 
savings became less as the members moved to higher tax 
brackets. Compounding at 10 percent, the absolute value of 
the savings decreased from $637,341 to 636,96 7 . When non -
qualifieds were distributed, members did not pay taxes on 
their distribution. Thus, the only important fac tor was the 
cooperative (corporate) federal tax rate. 
security tax were also absent. 
Impacts of social 
The Indiana and eastern cooperatives paid dividends on 
preferred stock in addition to the nonqualified distributions. 
Both the cooperative and members paid ta xes on these divi-
dends. Therefore, member ta x liabilitie s occurred even 
though nonqualified equities were issued. This was not the 
case in the Iowa cooperative where no dividends were paid . 
Because members paid social security taxes and these 
taxes are very regressive, the lower average tax brackets 
(scenarios 1 and 2) were affected the most (Appendix Figures 
B.6-B.10). The members in the higher average tax brackets 
(sce narios 4 and 5) were already paying the maximum amount of 
social security tax regardless of the dividends they received. 
Hence, they were not affected. 
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In the eastern cooperative, another factor entered the 
analysis. The cooperative maintained no unallocated capital 
surplus. Therefore, when the losses were sustained the 
cooperative was forced to pass the losses on to their members . 
The difference between the COMPANY and TA X lines on th e member 
federal tax graphs was larger as the average tax bracket 
increased ( Appendix Figures B.11-B.15) . Therefore, the com-
pounded values increased from scenario 1 through scenario 5. 
Member's net cash flow 
The method of depreciating fixed assets had implications 
for the member's net cash flow from the cooperative earnings 
distribution . Th e level of cas h patronage paid by the cooper -
ative (as a portion of the qualified distribution) was also 
important. The results in all three cooperatives indicated 
that at a level of 30 percent c ash patronage the members 
received more net cash when rapid - ACRS wa s used . This was 
true without regard to the average tax bracket of the member . 
In part, this can be explained by the fact that with 
rapid-ACRS they were receiving a smaller taxable 
distribution. 4 The cash di stri bution associated with the 
4For example, member s in the 40 percent tax bracket may 
receive a qualified distribu t ion of $80 when rapid-ACRS is 
used and $100 if ACRS-SL is used . They both receive 30 per -
cen t of the distribution in cash than the rapid-ACRS resu l ts 
in -$8 to me mbers while ACRS-SL results in -$10 to me mbe r s . 
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COMPANY runs wa s not large en ough to cove r the tax liabiliti es 
that must be paid on the larger quali fied distribut io n 
received. In addition to this , t he ITC avail able to pass to 
members in rap i d-ACRS runs wa s greater than the ITC passed to 
members in ACRS-SL run s. This is be cau se the earnings we re 
l arger in ACRS-SL runs, thus, more ITC was used to cover the 
tax liability on the additions to capital su rp lus and to pay 
out cash patronage to members than i n rapid - ACRS runs . At 
lower level s of cash patronage, the relat ive importan ce of ITC 
passed to members wa s greater than at higher levels of cash 
patronage . 
Figures 3 . 21- 3 . 29 s how the net cash flo w to members at 
30, 40, and 45 percent cash patronage for members i n the Io wa 
coop era tiv e in different tax brackets under the assumption of 
sc enarios 1, 4, and 5 (Appe nd ix Figures B.16-B . 33) . 5 The 
TAX lines were above the COMPANY lines for both qualified and 
nonqual ified runs at 30 percent cash patro nage . 
At c ash patronage levels of 40 and 45 percent, it is more 
diffi cult to see wheth er membe r s we re better of f with rapid -
5The total ca sh flow to members in the same tax 
brackets but differen~enarios wil l not be the same because 
of the assumption of the five scenarios of member distribution 
discussed in Chapter 2 . For example , the members of the 35% 
tax bracket in Sce nario 1 re ceiv e less total cash flo w than 
the members of the 35% tax bracket i n Sce nari~ --,=-t;U'"s, the 
sce nari os are not comparable in this manner . 
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ACRS depreciation or ACRS-SL depreciation by looking at the 
graphs. The level of cash did not affect the nonqua l ified net 
cash flow because it was assumed that the entire nonq ualified 
distribution was paid in nontaxable equities . Since only 
nonqualified allocated equities were being distributed, the 
entire tax liability fell at the cooperative level . 
The stream of cash flow to members ove r the entire 10 
years wa s co nsidered. Table 3 . 8 is a compar ison of t he 
qualified TAX results and the qualified COMPANY results. The 
difference between the two net cash flow values for members 
each year was calculated ove r the 10 year period . The values 
were then mult i plied by the appropriate future value factors 
and the resulting values were summed over the 10 years . 6 
At 30 percent cash patronage, the compounded numbers are 
positive confirming that the net cash flow to members from TAX 
runs is greater than the net ca sh flow to members from COMPANY 
runs . The Iowa and I ndiana cooperatives have the same 
pattern. If the cooperative' s member tax bracket distribution 
6 
10 
I [(TaxNCF - Compa nyN CF) * FVCF. ] , n=l 1 ,n 
TaxNCF = net cas h flow to members from TAX run, 
CompanyNCF = net cas h flow to members from COMPANY run, 
n = year, i = interest rate, 
FVCF . 1 = 
1 , n ( l+i ) n 
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Tab le 3.8 Future value, net cash fl ow to members - qua lified tax vs . 
qualified company a 
Compound 
T~Qe of comQarison rate Iowa Indiana Eastern 
Scenar io 1 
20% tax bracket 
30% cash 10% $5,519 $12,828 $346,414 
12 6,438 14,264 394,358 
14 7,556 15, 85 7 432,096 
Scenario 1 
20% tax bracket 
40% cash 10 (18,472) (38 ,140) 24 ,967 
12 (21 , 234) (42,656) 25 ,151 
14 (24 ,320) (47 ,707) 25 ,964 
Scenari o 1 
20% tax bracket 
45% cash 10 (30,458) (56,884) (229,224 ) 
12 (35 ,070) (63 ,606 ) (252 ,947) 
14 (41 ,180) (71 ,123) (297 ,153 ) 
Scenari o 4 
35% tax bracket 
30% cash 10 16,260 33,929 496, 713 
12 18,826 37,862 553,564 
14 21,751 42,244 617,393 
Scenario 4 
35% tax bracket 
40% cash 10 (4, 075) (18 , 741) 188,528 
12 (4,726) (20 ,946 ) 211 , 195 
14 (5 ,444) (23 ,412) 237 , 220 
Scenario 4 
35% tax bracket 
45% cash 10 ( 19, 762) (37 ,489) 41,030 
12 (22 , 756) ( 41, 900) 52 , 097 
14 ( 26, 118) (46, 833) 64,411 
Scenario 5 
50% tax bracket 
30% cash 10 4,588 8,839 111,662 
12 5,293 9, 875 124 , 581 
14 6, 090 11, 031 139 ,033 
Scenar io 5 
50% tax bracket 
40% cash 10 2,183 3,749 62 ' 271 
12 2,517 4,190 69,528 
14 2,894 4,683 77 , 719 Scenario 5 
50% tax bracket 
45% cash 10 991 1,873 46,415 
12 1, 141 2, 094 51 , 803 
14 1 310 2 340 56 123 
a(QUALIFIED TAXNCF - QUALIFIED COMPANYNCF ) . 
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fits scenario 1 or scenario 4, a 40 percent and a 45 percent 
cash patronage wi 11 result in more cash flow to members by 
using ACRS - SL. However, if the distribution of member tax 
brackets centers at a higher average tax bracket even at a 
level of 45 percent cash patronage members receive more by 
using rapid-ACRS. In the case of the 50 percent tax bracket, 
they wi 11 have to pay less (not receive more) since in almost 
every year their net cash flow was negative. 
The members in the eastern cooperative were in a differ -
ent net cash flow position. The only situation where members 
were better off with ACRS-SL (received more net cash flow ) was 
when the average tax bracket of members was very low ( scenario 
1) and when the cooperative was paying 45 percent cash 
patronage. In every other case, the cooperative benefitted 
members more by using rapid-ACRS. 
The primary reason that the net cash flow to members in 
the eastern cooperatfve differed from the other two 
cooperatives wa s the two loss years they encountered . The 
fact that they passed the loss to their members instead of 
reducing capital surplus allowed t he members to enjoy large 
tax savings i n those years. On the graphs, t he peak year was 
1987. The gap between the TAX and COMPANY runs wa s greatest 
in tha t year. Furthermore, the gap was large enough t o have a 
major impact on the overall out come of member net cas h flow 
for the entire 10 year period. Without the l oss, t he net cas h 
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flow to members would probably look more like the net cash 
flow to members in the Indiana and Iowa cooperatives. 
Member equity 
At this point, it is ne cess ary to examine the impacts of 
the Book-to - Tax (BTT) system of account ing. Book-to-ta x is a 
means of reconciling differences when allocations are made on 
the basis of CO MPAN1 earnings and TAX earnings. BTT is 
necessary only for equity measurement. (The previous results 
were not changed as a result of using BTT accounting . ) 
Figures 3 . 30-3 . 38 show the trend in allocated equities when 
five different methods of allocation occur . They include: 
(1) qualified equities-COMPANY run; (2) qualified equities-TA X 
run; (3) nonqualified equities-COMPANY run; ( 4) nonqualified 
equities - TAX run; and (5) nonqualified equities - BTT run . 
By simply looking at the bottom four lines, the allocated 
equity from TAX runs was generally lower ( at least until 45 
percent cash patronage was paid). These results were not 
surprising in view of the investment patterns that were 
assumed. In the earlier years, the depreciation expense from 
the TAX runs was so much greater than the depreciation expense 
of COMPANY runs that earnings were substantially lower. As a 
direct consequence of lower earnings in those years, the 
earnings distributions were smaller in the TAX runs. 
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If the runs had gone beyond 10 years and no additional 
investments had been made, the pattern would have changed 
[27] . The COMPANY run would have had lower earnings ( and 
smaller distributions). COMPANY runs would still have 
depreciation expe nse on a straig ht-line basis. The reduction 
in distributable earnings due to depreciation expense takes 
place over a much longer period. Consequently, the distribu -
tions to members from straight-line depreciation would not 
fluctuate to the degree that they fluctuate in the TAX runs . 
The COMPANY earnings therefore tended to be higher than TAX 
earnings in the initial years and lower than TAX in latter 
years . 
In the TAX runs, members in the early years did not 
receive as large a distribution relative to members in later 
years . Because the depreciation expense fell entire ly on the 
members in the first five years of the asset life, a radical 
change occurred in the sixth year. 
As long as the membership and the volume of business done 
by individual members does not change, there would not be a 
serious problem . In later years, the same members would 
receive larger distributions in equal proportion. But if 
membership does c hange or the proportion of volume changes, 
all members are not treated fa i rly and equitably. At thi s 
point, rapid-ACRS could be rejected because it does not 
provide fair and equitable treatment to members over time. 
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However, the BTT system of accounting ca n be used to re solve 
the problem. 
In the provisions in ERTA-1981, cooperatives are allowed 
to pay taxes on TAX ( rapid-ACRS) earnings and to distribute 
allocations based on COMPANY (ACRS-SL) earnings . They are 
allowed to create a reserve for excess rapid-ACRS deprecia-
tion. Nonqualifieds may be issued to current members against 
the reserve. 
This increases the accounting responsibilities of the 
cooperative but the results indicate that the benefit BTT 
provides members may well be worth the extra effort and time . 
The top line on the graphs were from the nonqualifi ed BTT 
runs . Nonqualified allocated equities grew at a faster rate 
when BTT was implemented. This occurred because in the BTT 
run, the difference between the rap id-ACRS depreciation 
expense and the ACRS-SL depreciation expe nses was put into a 
reserve account in the equity section . The reserve account 
was offset by a corresponding increase (decrease ) in nonqua l i-
fied al located equities to cover 90 percent of the reserve. 
An increase (dec rease ) in capita l surplus to cover 10 percent 
of earnings from nonmembe r sourced business accounted for the 
remainder of the reserve. Total member equity remained 
unchanged as a result of this (Appendix Figures B.34-B .4 2) . 
The ACRS-reserve is an unallocated equity account, but it 
is actual equity the cooperative has as a result of the rap i d-
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ACRS depreciation. Since the coo pera tive paid ta xes based on 
TA X earning s , they paid le ss in earlier years than if they had 
paid taxes based on COMPANY earn i ngs. This decreased ta x 
liability in earlier years wa s a source of additional equity 
for the coope rative. The quantity of the equity increa sed 
rapidly during the rapid-ACRS depreci ation peri od and de c li ned 
slowly as the deferred taxes are paid out in l ater years. 
Summary 
This chapter provided an analysis of sev era l possible 
methods of earnings distribution. Distr ibutions under two 
alternative methods of calculating net earnings were 
examined. 
Earnings were calculated in accordance with the new l aws 
go verning depreciation as establi s hed by ERTA -1981 . The tw o 
depreciation methods examined were rapid - ACRS and ACRS - SL . In 
general , net earnings were less when rapid-ACRS wa s used with 
a constant stream of inve st ments. Other results wer e as 
f ollo ws : 
1 ) Rapid - ACRS generated more wor king capital than 
straight line. Differences between the ACRS wor king cap i t al 
and the s traight-line wor ki ng capita l i ncreased as the 
per c entage of earnings paid out in cash increased. This was 
due t o the fact that a fixed percent payou t was applied to a 
lower earnings figure. 
105 
2) As the average tax bracket of members increased the 
total tax savings from issuing qualified patronage increased 
if rapid-ACRS depreciation was used and allocations were made 
on the basis of the ta x runs . 
3) At a l evel of 30 percent cash patronage, all members 
received higher net cash flow if rap id-ACRS was used; beyond 
30 percent this was not true . 
4 ) Using ACRS-SL when the average ta x bracket of members 
was low resulted in more cash f l ow to members even when the 
cooperative was paying 45 percent of its earnings in cash 
patronage . 
5) Allocated equitie s grew fastest when ~TT accounting 
was used and nonqualified allocations were distributed to 
members . Allocated equities ( qualifed and nonqualified ) grew 
to levels above either the TAX or the COMPANY when earnings 
were caluculated on the basis of TAX for computing corporate 
taxable i ncome and distr ib uted on the basis of COMPANY . These 
equities can be seen, however, only if a BTT statement 
reconciling BTT differences is prepared. 
6) Capital surplus grew at a faster rate under both 
qualified and nonqualified distribution when ACRS-SL was used 
rather than rapid-ACRS. 
7 ) The debt to equity ratio increased slightly wh e n 
rapid-ACR S was used instead of ACRS-S L. This was due t o the 
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fact that the BTT entry for the additional cash flow was not 
shown in either statement. 
8) In the two loss years where losses were passed to 
members, rapid-ACRS wa s more beneficial to the eastern poultry 
cooper ati ve patrons than ACRS-SL . 
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CHAPTER 4. EARNINGS DISTRIBUTION 
Comparison of Nonqualified and Qualified Allocations 
This chapter i s an analysis of the two main types of 
distribution a cooperative may use to di str ibute net earnings 
to their members. The analysis was designed to compare the 
impacts on the cooperative and its members, of using nonquali-
fied allocations rather than qualified allocations . The 
effects of equities on working capital, allocated member 
equities , capital surplus, debt to equity ratios, and cash 
flow to members were examined. 
One reason a cooperative may choose to distribute non-
qual ified allocated equity is to improve their equity redemp -
tion program [Royer] . Hence, limited analysis of impac ts 
under the assumption of equity retirement was conducted for 
each of the variables. 
Working capital 
At levels of 30 and 40 percent cash patronage, the quali-
fied allocations generated more working capital than nonquali-
fied allocations . These results are shown in Figures 
3.7-3 .1 5 . The cooperative was paying only cas h patronage and 
relatively small amounts of income ta xes ( if any) . Thus, the 
amount of working capital used was les s than the amount of 
working capital required to defray the corporate tax burden 
wh en nonqualified allocations were di stributed . At a level of 
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40 percent cash patronage, the qualified working capital lines 
fell substantially so that the gap between the qualified lines 
and nonqualified l ines was small . 
Although members would prefer to have larger cash patron-
age payments, there appears to be a limit to the extent that 
cooperatives can af f ord to in crease cash patronage at the 
expense of wor k ing capital, before nonqualifieds become 
feasible. This is t rue even when there is no retirement of 
nonqualified equities. With retirement of nonqualified 
equities, this point would be reached much sooner. 
At a level of 45 percent cash patronage, the qualified 
and nonqualified li nes come together. The data from the Iowa 
cooperative indicated that qualified all oca tions stil l 
generated more working capital ( Figure 3 . 12). However, the 
eastern and Indiana results showed that at 45 percent cash 
patronage a change occurred (Fig ures 3.9 & 3 . 15 ) . 
The Indiana cooperative definitely generated more workin g 
capital by allocati ng nonqualified equities rather than using 
the qualified allocation. The working capi tal required to pay 
the cash portion of the qualified allocation was so large that 
the cooperative used l ess working capital to pay corporate 
taxes on a nonqualified distribution . In other words, the use 
of working capital to defray taxes was less than the use of 
funds for cash patronage payout. Two factors contrib uting to 
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Table 4.1 Future value, working capital - nonqualified vs. qualifieda 
Compound 
T~Qe of comQarison rate Iowa Indiana Eastern 
Nonqualified tax 
vs. qualified tax 
( 40%) 10% $(1,252,489 ) $ ( 377, 330 ) $(4, 054,761 ) 
12 (1,367,184) (414,558) (4,291 ,514) 
14 (1 , 496, 345) (501,543) (4,556, 313) 
Nonqualified tax 
vs. qualified tax 
( 45% ) 10 (354,859 ) 736 , 319 (930 , 711 ) 
12 (389,896 ) 827 , 937 (957,153 ) 
14 (429,429 ) 868,959 (986,423 ) 
Nonqualified tax vs. 
qualified company 
( 30%) 10 (3 ,738,849 ) (639,279 ) 2, 655 ,144 
12 (4,074,393) (724,983 ) 2,970 ,96 3 
14 (4 ,451,599 ) ( 821, 545) 3,324,589 
Nonqualified tax vs. 
qualified company 
( 40%) 10 347,706 2, 260 ,436 12,366,893 
12 376,719 2,433,674 13,361,343 
14 408,265 2,627,346 14,438 , 373 
Nonqualified tax 
vs . qualified company 
( 45%) 10 1,484, 260 fo 11 ows fo 11 OWS 
12 1,614,827 same same 
14 1,760,546 pattern pattern 
a(NONQUALIFIEDWC - QUALIFIEDWC). 
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this result were the investment pattern and the earnings 
pattern of the Indiana cooperative. 
The figures for the eastern cooperative do not show 
clearly which method of allocation results in more working 
capital to the cooperative over the 10 years because the lines 
cross at points in the 10-year projection period (Figures 
3.12-3.15) . The absolute differences between the working 
capital generated by nonqualified TAX runs and qualified TAX 
runs was calculated and summed. The value for each year was 
compounded and summed over the ten years to arrive at an 
estimate. The results show that allocating qualified equities 
when using rapid-ACRS generated more wor k ing capital over the 
10 years. Table 4.1 gives the comparison of future values for 
working capital under the assumption that nonqualified 
equities would have been issued rather than quali fied 
equities. 
Working capital with equity retirement 
The analysis above suggested that by distributing non-
qual ified allocations the cooperative may be better able to 
retire equities . Analysis of TAX qualified distribution was 
co nducted at cash patronage level s of 30 and 45 percent versus 
TAX nonqualified distributions. 
Figures 4.1-4.2 show the 10 year pattern. At 30 percent, 
the qualified allocation resulted in greater working capital 
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and the lines were parallel for the 10 years . However, at 45 
percent there was a different pattern. The nonqualified TAX 
working capital line was higher than the qualified - TAX working 
capital line. In addition to this change, the l ines were no 
longer parallel. The qualified TA X working capital line fell 
substantially after 1987. The burden of paying larger c ash 
patronages and of retiring equities had seriously er oded the 
working capital. Although nonqualified equity was not 
retired, it is hypothesized that the working capital of the 
cooperative would be greater than in this case because of the 
taxation procedure of nonqualified equities. 
Total tax liability 
The question of who pays the ta xes is a conc ern to both 
the members and the cooperative . Since taxes are potentially 
due at the member level as well as the cooperative level, it 
ca n not be addressed at the cooperative level al one. The 
coo perative board must consider the entire tax liab il ity paid 
by member s and the cooperative corporation. 
The following graph s for the eastern coop erati ve were the 
result of combining total membe r ta x liability and total 
cooperative tax liability for each meth od of a lloca tion 
( Figures 4.3-4 . 7) . In every scenario , the nonqual ified TAX 
line wa s on the bottom indicating that total taxes we re less 
when nonqual ifieds were distributed in conjunction with rapid -
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ACRS depreciation . Progressing from scenario 1 to scenario 5, 
qualified total taxes increased due to the fact that the 
average tax bracket of members had increased . This resulted 
in an i ncrease in the member tax liability. 
The Io wa cooperative show ed a different pattern after 
1987 (Figures 3.16-3. 20) . The underlying cause for the change 
was the i r relatively inactive investment pattern . After 1987, 
depreciation expense in the TAX runs was less than deprecia-
tion expense in the COMPANY runs . Therefore, earnings were 
greater in the TAX runs than in the COMPANY runs. As a conse-
quence of this switch in the earnings pattern , the combined 
tax liabilities of th e members and the cooperative of the 
COM PAN! run fell below the combi ned member and corporate tax 
liabilities of the TAX runs (the nonqualified COMPANY line is 
below the nonqual ified TAX line in al l of the scenario 5 
cases). However , in both cases nonqualified equity distribu -
tions generated lower overall tax liability than qualified 
equity distributions . The same pattern was evident in the 
Indiana cooperative (Appendix Figures B. 1 - B. 5) . 
A preliminary analysi s completed early in this study did 
not include member social security tax liability . Wi th~ut 
social security tax the results were different . It was not 
until scenario 4 and scenario 5 that nonqualified TAX, 
resulted in the lowest taxes as indicated in Figures 4 . 8- 4.1 2 . 
The regressive impact of the social security tax was 
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sufficient to change the results . The inclusion of the self-
employment tax in the model increased the member tax liability 
enough to cause the qualified total tax lines to move above 
the nonqualified total tax lines for all the scenarios except 
scenario 1 in the Indiana and Iowa case cooperatives. 
The future values for the difference in total taxes paid 
from qualified and nonqualified allocations are shown in 
Table 4.2 for selected scenarios. The negative numbers in 
every case except scenario 1 for Iowa and Indiana confirmed 
the results that the total tax savings was increased when 
nonqualified equities were distributed rather than qualified 
equities. 
Total tax liability with retirement 
When equity was retired, there was no cha nge in the total 
tax liability. Since only qualified equities were retired in 
the study, no member or cooperative ta x liability was created. 
This would not be the case if nonqualifieds had been retired. 
If retiring nonqualified equities, member s would be required 
to pay taxes on the income received as ordinary income. The 
cooperative would in turn take a deduction in the amount of 
the retirement from total taxable inc ome . This deduction is 
allowed to the cooperative since it paid taxes on the equit i es 
when they wer e issued. This principle of single taxation of 
net savings dictates that the deduction may be taken at the 
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Table 4. 2 Future value, total member and corgorate tax liability -
nonqualified tax vs . qualified tax 
Compound 
T~Ee of comEarison rate Iowa Indiana Eastern 
Scenario 1 10% 121, 651 151,422 (780 , 7 46) 
12% 124,950 157,290 (887 ,670 ) 
14% 133,581 183 ,621 (1 ,000 , 911 ) 
Scenario 2 10% (38 ,981) (39,970 ) (1 , 430, 788 ) 
12% (47,484 ) (39,184) (1 , 600, 831) 
14% (57,460) (37 ,695 ) (1 , 792 , 870 ) 
Scenario 3 10% (104,077) ( 112, 855) follows 
12% (120 ,111 ) (120 ,882 ) pattern of 
14% (138,850) (128 ,949 ) See . 1&2 
Scenario 4 10% fo 11 OWS fo 11 ows fo 11 ows 
12% pattern of pattern of pattern of 
14% See . 2&3 See . 2&3 See . 1&2 
a(NONQUALIFIEO TAXTTL - QUALI FIED TAXTTL) . 
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time the equity is retired . Despite the fact that th e members 
would be taxed on the equity redeemed, the net c ash flo w 
position of members would be positive . This occu r s because 
when nonqualified equ ities are retired, they are redeemed for 
100 pe rcent c a s h . 
Allocated equities 
Many cooperatives di s tribute qualified equities based on 
straight - li ne (COM PAN Y) earnings becau se th is method al lo ws 
equity to grow at a more rapid rate. The results from the 
Iowa co operative indicated that this strategy was effec tive if 
the cooperat i ve wa s paying no more t ha n 30 percent c ash 
patr onage (Figures 3.33-3.35). On the oth er hand, at 40 
percent cash patronage, the resu l ts fr om th e Indian a co opera-
ti ve show e d that the allocated equit ie s fr om a qualified 
COM PAN Y run did not grow any faster than the allocated equit y 
fr om a BTT run where non qual ified equity was created (Figures 
3 . 30 - 3 . 32) . 
In fact, after 19 86 al located equity gre w faster in th e 
nonqualif ied BTT run. At higher levels of ca sh pa t r onage , the 
al loca ted equity from qua lifi ed COMP AN Y runs fell far below 
the al loc ated equity from the BTT ru n and as cash patronage 
in creased, th e gap betwe e n the two increased . 
As mentioned previously, in the BTT run t he ACRS - reserve 
account i s offset in th e equ ity sec ti on by a nonq ual i fied 
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distribution to members. This extra equity provided equity 
funds for the cooperative to use and as the graphs indicate, 
it grew quickly during the years of rapid-ACRS and tapered off 
in later years . 
The equity that wa s allocated in the BTT run was nonqual -
ified equity because Rev . Rul. 74 - 274 essentially eliminates 
the possibility of distributin g qualified allocations in a BTT 
situation . The ruling states, "A distribution by a nonexempt 
cooperative that used different methods of depreciation for 
net book earnings and net earnings from business done with or 
for patrons reported for federal income tax purposes will 
qualify as a patronage dividend~ to the extent of the net 
earnings reported for federal in come tax purpose" [60] . The 
ru lin g i ndicated th a t if a cooperative has pa i d taxes on the 
basis of rapid - ACRS earnings, it cannot distribute on the 
basis of COMPANY ea r nings unless the distribution is taxable 
to the cooperative and reported as such. 
This ruling prevents a coo perative from calculating 
taxable income based on rapid-ACRS earnings , then distributing 
qualified equities based upon a large earnings calculated on a 
slower depreciation schedule. In essence, the ruling states 
that the cooperative can not deduct the large qualified 
patronage distribution from its already artificially lo w 
federal taxable income . 
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A nonqualified allocation for the amount of earnings in 
excess of the taxable income, how ever , does not violate the 
Rev. ruling . The cooperative may pay taxes on the basis of 
TAX (ra pid-ACRS ) earnings and distribute on the basis of 
COMPANY earnings as long as the coop erativ e issues a taxable 
nonqualified distribution. In later years, when the nonquali-
fied equities are redeemed, the cooperative can deduct the 
distribution from its federal income taxes . 
Capita l surplus 
Capital surplus grew at a steady rate regardless of 
whether qualified or nonqualified allocations were used . 
However, the growth rat e was faster when qualified allocations 
were distributed (Figure 4.13 - 4.14). The faster growth rate 
under qualified distribution was a result of the higher levels 
of taxation at the cooperative l evel. The 10 percent retained 
into capital surplus under qualified was frequently taxed at a 
lower marginal rate s in ce unallocated surplus was frequently 
the only taxable income. In qualified runs, only the amount 
allocated to stock dividends and capital s urplus was taxed . 
The remainder could be deducted from ta xable income. 
In nonqualified runs, all of the earnings were taxed at 
the corporate level. The marginal corporate tax rates changed 
at increments of $25,000 up to $100,000. The mod el did not 
calc ulate the tax for nonqualified allocated equities and 
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capital surplus separately . Instead, the earnings were taxed 
before distribution . No distinction was possib le between the 
tax rate on the nonqual ified equities account and the capital 
surp lu s account. Hence, a lo wer remainder was available for 
distribution to member s and capital surplus . 
Member equities with retirement of qualified equities 
Subs t ant ial changes in the equity section of the balance 
sheets were sho wn when equity retirement was simulated . 
Figures 4.15-4 . 16 show these changes . The top two lines 
represent no retirement situations that resulted fr om qua l i -
fied TAX and nonqualified TAX runs. The bottom two lines 
represent the siutat ion, that would result if four percent of 
qualified allocated equite s had to be retired using qualified 
TAX and nonqualified TAX runs. Wi thout a retirement plan , 
equity grew rapidly when qualified equities rather than 
nonqual ified equities were distributed . However , when equity 
was retired, the qualified allocated equity and nonqualified 
allocated equity lines were nearly the same ( assuming a 30 
percent cash patronage payout to members). Because ret irement 
was based on four percent of the qualified equity pool, the 
result s are not directly comparab l e . 
Within the nonq ua lified runs, the qualified account did 
not grow, therefore the amount retired wa s less each year 
because four percent of a shrinki ng pool wa s retired . 
3,000 
2 , 900 
2 ,800 
2, 700 
2 , 600 
2, 500 
CJ) 
)...I 
Cl) 
rl 2 , 400 rl 
0 
Cl 
0 2 , 300 
0 
0 
- rl 
2 , 200 
2 , 100 
2 ,000 
1,900 
1 , 800 
1,700 
/ 
/ 
---- - Qualified Tax - No ReLJrement / . . . . . Nonqual i f led Tax - No Ret irement 
/ Qualified Tax - Re l lremenc - ·- - ·- NonquaJ H l ed Tax - Retiremen t / 
-/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ ~ 
,,,-- - _/ 
/ 
/ 
. . . . 
~ 
/ 
/ . , ~ -::;:::;--
/ · ~ 
~ 
---·--
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Figur e 4 .1 5 Iowa , Alloca t ed Equities wi r- h Equity Retirement-4 ~~ of Qual if i ed Pool , 
30% Cash Patronage 
/ 
/ 
~ ....... w 
w 
1991 
3, 000 
2 , 900 
2 , 800 
2 , 700 
2 , 600 
2 , 500 
(/) ,... 
co 2 , 400 rl 
rl 
0 
t=l 
0 2 , 300 
0 
0 
rl 
2,200 
2 , 100 
2 , 000 
1 , 900 
1 , 800 
1 , 700 
_ __ Qua ! if l ed Tax - No Re t l r cmen t 
• •.. • • No nqual Hled Tax - No Ret iremen t 
----- Qua ! if l ed Tax - Re t iremen t 
- ·-· - No nquaJlfled Tax - Retiremen t 
1982 
./ 
./ 
./ 
. . . . . . . :./' 
...-- - - ./ 
1983 1984 1985 
./ 
/ 
1986 1987 1988 
. "/ 
. ' / 
• / , 
· / 
·/ 
•/ 
1989 1990 1991 
Fi g ure 4 . 16 Iowa , Allocated Equities With Equily Retirement-4 % of Qualified Poo l, 
45% Cash Pat~onage 
135 
However, within the qualified runs, the qualified account had 
additions made to it each year . Therefore , the absolute 
amount retired in qua lified runs was far greater than the 
amount retired in nonqualified runs . The nonqualified equity 
account was gro wing steadily in the nonqualified runs without 
any nonqualified equities being retired. Meanwhile in the 
qualified runs, the equity pool was growing and retirements 
were made at the four percent level of a larg er pool. 
At a level of 45 percent cash patronage, the result was 
even more pionounced. The qualified equity account was 
eroding quickly in the qualified run . Quali fied equity was 
not growing at a suffic i ent rate to keep up with the rate of 
equity retirement since 45 percent of each year's earnings was 
paid out in cash. The nonqualified allocated equity account 
remained the same under all levels of cash patronage since 
there was no cash paid on nonqualified distribution . 
Analysis was somewha t limited in that a direct comparison 
of nonqualifieds and qualified retirement was not possible. 
However , it did illustrate the results of a transition period 
of s witching from qualified to nonqualified allocated 
equities . This situation is a l ikely path for most 
coope ratives in the process of moving from an equity base of 
mostly qualified to one of mostly nonqu alified . 
At some point, the nonqualified equity must be ret i red 
also. The expected results of this would b~ much different 
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than th ose sho wn ab ove in several respects . First, there 
would be a tax deduction f or each dollar of nonqualified 
retired. This would allow a " swap" of a new do l lar of tax 
paid equity for each dollar of equit y retired . No cash 
patronage would be r equir ed to make this swap . Equity growth 
would again require that additional taxes be paid by the 
coope rat ive for each dol lar of new nonqual ifi ed equity brought 
int o the cooperative . 
Total member equity f ol lowed th e s ame pattern but because 
of the difference in the unallocated capital surplus accounts 
men ti oned earlier, the changeover did not occur as quickly as 
cash patr onage increased (A ppendix Figures B.4 3- B.44 ) . Total 
member equity in the qualifi e d runs fell slo wer than the 
alloc ated equity in quali fied runs . 
Debt to equity 
The debt to equ ity ratio varied inver se ly wit h the equity 
accounts . Si nce long term debt wa s he l d constant , the only 
de termin i ng factor wa s total member equity . With out equity 
retirement , the qualified runs generated more member equity , 
therefore, the debt t o equity rati o was lower than when 
nonqualifi ed equities wer e di stri buted (F igures 4 . 17-4 . 19 ) . 
The graphs for both Indiana and Io wa coo peratives exhibited a 
difference that wa s not very significant . 
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As the cash patronage increased, the qualified lines and 
nonqualified lines tended to converge. This was expected as 
the level of cash paid to members approached the level of tax 
liability on the nonqualifieds . The eastern cooperative 
showed the same convergence but the debt to equity ratio was 
much higher because it used relatively more debt to finance 
their operations over the 10 year period. 
Equity retirement changed the outcome. At 30 percent, 
the nonqualified debt to equity lines were above the qualified 
debt to equity lines. This was again a result of the 
depletion of the allocated equity accounts (Figure 4.20 ) . At 
45 percent cash patronage, the pattern changed (Figure 4.21) . 
The debt to equity ratio that resulted from distributing 
qualified equities exceeded the debt to equity ratio that 
resulted from distributing the nonqualified equities . Again, 
this is a result of how the allocated equity ac counts changed 
when qualified equity was retired. 
Net cash flow to members 
Evaluating the net cash flow to members was somewhat 
difficult because of the lack of empirical information and the 
many variables involved. Problems included the follow i ng : 
( 1 ) the particular distri bution of tax brackets among members 
in a cooperative was generally not known . Hence, these were 
approximated by assuming a quasi norm al member tax bracket 
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distribution scenarios; 1 (2) the marginal tax brackets of 
the majority of individual members may change from year to 
year, therefore causing the statistical distribution to change 
from year to year . This was solved by providing a variety of 
sce na r ios to al l ow approximatation of five alternative quasi 
normal distributions; and (3) the level of cash patronage will 
impact member cash flow dramatically. Therefore, a number of 
levels of cash patronage payout were run . 
Two definite conclusions can be drawn from the data and 
the graphs. First , under any scenario and any level of cash 
patronage, those individuals in the 20 percent marginal tax 
bracket have higher net cash flow if qualified equit ies are 
distributed than would be the case if nonqualifeds had been 
used (Figures 3.21 and 3 . 23). Second, under any scenario and 
any level of cash patronage, those individuals in the 50 
percent marginal tax bracket have higher net cash flow if 
nonqualified equities are distributed (Figures 3 . 27 - 3. 29 ) . 
The individuals in the 50 percent marginal tax bracket 
generally have negative net cash flow when qualified equities 
are distributed with cash less than 50% . That will not be the 
case if nonqualified equities are distributed . The two 
1The alternative to this wa s collecting actual tax 
information from members. The problems of getting an adequate 
response to requests for such personal financial information 
were considered to be greater than the benefits of havin g the 
information . 
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conclusions pose a dilemma for the cooperatives because in 
actual ity each cooperative probably has members in both 
marginal tax brackets . 
The net cash flow to members i n the middle tax brackets 
i s not as clearly defin ed (Figures 3 . 24-3 . 26) . If scenario 4 
is examined, the 35 percent marginal tax bracket, and 30 
percent cash patronage is paid, the situation for members in 
the eastern cooperative is a toss-up. By compounding the 
difference between the net cash flow to members from nonquali-
fied runs and qualified runs, the results showed that members 
received $10,875 (at 10%) less when nonqualified were 
distributed rather th an qualified allocati ons (T ables 4 . 3 and 
4 . 4). The amount in creased at levels of cash patronage ab ove 
35 percent. 
In the other cooperatives , the qualified runs generated 
higher net cash flow to members than the nonqualified runs . 
As cash patronages increase, the gap between the qualified and 
nonqualified lines widened even further. 
An element a board needs to consider is fair treatme nt of 
members . Not al 1 members were treated fairly when qualified 
equities were distributed . At the time nonqual ified equities 
were allocated, all member s were treated fairly because no one 
received a taxable distribution since the cooperative assumed 
the tax liability on the allocation. Figures 3 . 21 - 3 . 29 show a 
fairly co nstant net cash flow across tax brackets fo r 
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Table 4.3 Future value, eastern, net cash flow to members, nonqualified 
tax vs. qual ified tax, scenario 4, 35% tax bracket a 
Type of comparison 
Nonq ualified tax vs . qualif ied tax 
30% cash patronage 
Nonqualified tax vs . qua lified tax 
40% cash patronage 
Nonqualified tax vs . qualified tax 
45% cash patronage 
Compound 
rate 
10% 
12 
14 
10 
12 
14 
10 
12 
14 
a(NONQUALIFIED TAXNCF - QUALIFIED TAXNCF ) . 
Net 
futu re values 
(10 ,875 ) 
(20 , 739 ) 
(32,270 ) 
(329 ,621) 
(366 ,168) 
(407 , 670 ) 
(41 7, 138 ) 
(449,624 ) 
(485 ,182) 
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Table 4.4 Future value, eastern, Indiana, net cash flow to members, 
nonqualified tax vs . qualified tax, scenario 5, 50% tax 
bracket a 
Future values 
Compound 
T.n~e of com~arison rate Eastern Indi ana 
Nonqualif ied tax 
vs . qualified tax 
30% cash patronage 10% 63,088 21 , 715 
12 77 ,022 24 ,813 
14 83 ,684 28 ,340 
Nonqua lified tax 
vs. qualified tax 
40% cash patronage 10 23 ,427 11, 248 
12 26 ,491 12 , 825 
14 29,852 14,616 
Nonqualif i ed tax 
vs. qualified tax 
45% cash patronage 10 14,247 6,307 
12 15,632 7,056 
14 17,140 7,904 
a(NONQUALIFIED TAXNCF - QUALIFIED TAXNCF) . 
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nonqual ified distributions.2 When nonqua l ified equities are 
retired, the equities are taxed to members at different 
marginal tax rates, but the di stribu tion is paid entirely in 
cash. Therefore, ~members will receive positive net cash 
flow since the cash portion will be large enough to defray the 
tax liability, regardless of member tax bracket. 
Net cash flow with retirement 
As qualified equity wa s retired, the gap increased 
between qualified net cash flow and nonqualifi ed net cash flow 
(Figures 4.22-4.27). Si nce qualified equity was being retired 
while no nonqualified equity was paid out, the absolute 
amounts of equity flowing back to farmers in cash was greater. 
The members received all of the cash from the retired equities 
because they had pai d taxes on the distribution in earlier 
years when it had been allocated. Also, the total amount 
retired wa s less in the nonqualified run s because the pool of 
qualified equities did not grow during the projection period . 
There wa s only one case where nonqual ified allocations 
resulted in more net cash flow to members. This was at a 
2The va ri ati on in the net cash flow is due to the tax 
liability sce nari o assumption described in Chapter 2 and the 
fact that members receive ITC. Thirty percent of the member -
ship falls into the 20 perce nt bracket in scenario 1, only 
three percent of membership falls into the 20 percent bracket· 
in scenario 4 and in scenario 5, only two percent were assumed 
to be in the 20 percent tax bracket. Thus , different amounts 
of ITC were distributed to the entire group depending upon the 
scenario . 
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Table 4.5 Future value, Iowa, net cash flow to members, nonqualified tax 
vs . qualified tax, retirementa 
Iowa 
Type of comparison Future value 10% 12% 14% 
Scenario 1 
20% tax bracket 
30% cash (165, 548) (182, 660) ( 202, 061 ) 
Scenario 1 
20% tax bracket 
45% cash ( 301, 31 7) (334,934 ) ( 372, 98 7) 
Scenario 4 
35% tax bracket 
30% cash (102, 359 ) (111, 438 ) (165, 414 ) 
Scenario 4 
35% t ax bracket 
45% cash (238,221 ) (263, 861 ) (292,854 ) 
Scenario 5 
50% tax bracket 
30% cash 7, 771 9, 061 10' 524 
Scenario 5 
50% tax bracket 
45% cash (5,816 ) (6,184 ) (6,592 ) 
a(NONQUALIFIED TAXNCF - QUALIFIED TAXNCF). 
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level of 30 percent cash patronage and the 50 percent marginal 
tax bracket in the Iowa cooperative (Figure 4 . 27) . The 
compounded values are shown in Table 4.5. Again, the situa-
tions are not entirely comparable because nonqualified s were 
not retired. Members would receive positive net cash flow 
when nonqualifieds are redeemed, even though they pay taxes 
because they receive the entire amount in cash. 
Summary 
This chapter looked at two types of equity allocations to 
members under rapid-ACRS, ACRS-SL and BTT. 
Simulated earnings allocated to members in the f orm of 
qualified and nonqualified equities were examined in this 
section . Three levels of cash patronages were distributed as 
a portion of the qualified allocations . The results from this 
chapter were as follows: 
1) At levels of 30 and 40 percent cash patronage with no 
equity retirement, the qualified allocations generated more 
working capital than nonqua li fieds. At 45 percent, the 
working capital generated in nonqualifi ed distributions 
equalled or surpassed the working capital generated by 
qualified distributions, in two of the three cooperatives . 
This re sult occurred due to the shifting of the tax burden 
from the cooperative to the members at the lower levels of 
cash patronage when qualified allocations were made. 
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2) With equity retirement, the qualified run generated 
more working capital at 30 percent c ash patronage but at 45 
percent the nonqualified distribution generated much mo re 
working capital than the qualified. 
3) In almost every case, the combined total of taxes paid 
by members and the cooperative when earnings were distributed 
as nonqualified allocations were le ss than the total me mber 
and corporate taxes that wou l d result from distributin g 
earnings as qualified a l locati ons . 
4) Qualified allocati ons resulted in a higher rate of 
growth in equities if ·a 30 percent cas h patronage was paid. 
In general, at levels of 40 and 45 percent cash patronage, the 
equities grew faster by di s tributing nonqualified al lo catio ns . 
The pattern was the same when qualified equity was retired . 
5) The capital surplus account grew faster when qua lified 
allocations were distribut ed du e t o the fact that the 10% 
addition t o capital surplu s wa s calculated on the ba sis of 
after tax cooperative earnings. 
6) The results confirmed t he di lemma that exists among 
member s in the different tax brack ets . Members in the lower 
tax bracket s (20 to 35 percent) received more net cash flow 
when qualified allocation s were di s tributed because they 
received a cas h pat'.onage larg e enough t o defray th eir ta x 
liability from their distr i bution. Ho wever, members in the 
highest tax brackets ( 45 to 50 per cent) did not. Theref ore, 
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their net cash flow situation improved when they received 
nonqualified allocations and the cooperative assumed the tax 
liability . Distributing nonqualified allocations was fair to 
all members, regardless of tax bracket because the coo perative 
assumes the tax liability on the di s trib utio n. 
The results vary slightly depending on the cooperative . 
They indicate that managers and boards need to look closely at 
their cooperative to determine which methods will maximize the 
net benefits to the members. The size of the cooperative, 
th eir in vestment decisions, the level of cash patronage, their 
equity retirement plan, and the average tax bracket of members 
are of parti cu lar importanc e . 
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CHAPTER 5. LOSSES 
Introduction 
The method a cooperat i ve uses to allocate earnings is 
relevan t not only when the cooperative has positive net earn -
ings but also when the cooperative sustains losses . The 
previous chapter focused on a stream of positive net earnings, 
except for two loss years in the eastern cooperative . In this 
chapter, the impacts on the cooperative and the members under 
the assumption that losses occurred in two consecutive years 
-
will be examined. This past year (1982) was a devastat i ng 
year for some local cooperatives and some regional coopera -
tives. Year - end earnings for 1983 show little promise for 
improvement. 
Several factors have led to the present economic situa-
tion of cooperatives. Spurred by an expectation of growing 
export markets in the coming years, cooperatives engaged in 
plant expansions. But the larger market has not material i zed; 
instead, the export market has been sluggish due to the 
strength of the dollar, bumper crops in the United States and 
a depressed international economy in general. The result of 
this expansion and sluggish markets has been overcapacity in 
many cooperatives . In addition to overcapacity of fixed 
assets, margins have fallen because of depressed prices for 
feed grains and soybeans due to the recent bumper cr ops. On 
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top of these factors are inflation and high interest rates of 
the past few years. Inflation has come to a ha lt and 
interest rates have come down but the real interest rates 
st i ll remain higher than a few years ago. Interest payments 
are eating away at the earnings and working capital of some 
cooperatives . The possibility of some cooperatives recovering 
during 1983 is bleak; therefore, managers and boards must 
learn to more effectively manage operating losses . 
The problem of handling losses is magnified when a 
regional cooperative operates at a loss . Federated reg ional 
coo perative operations have a direct impact on member coopera -
tives. Some financial decisions made at the regional level 
are linked directly to the financial health at the local coop -
erative level through the patronage they allocate back to the 
locals . 
There fo re, the way regionals handle ordinary net operat -
ing losses may beco me a critically important factor in the 
local cooperative's financial condition. This is particularly 
true as it relates t o the proper ta x treatment of the losses 
[ 56]. 
The regional cooperative has several alternatives for 
treating their losses. Some of the alternative treatments 
have not been viewed fav orably by the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) ; however, the IRS has reasoned that in a patronage busi -
ness operating losses occurred because overadvances were made 
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in the case of marketing cooperatives or underpricing occurred 
in input cooperatives . In other words, the cooperative simply 
misjudged its financial needs for the year. Therefore , the 
IRS reasons, current patrons should make up the difference. 
Interpreted in their most severe light some recent 
opinions of the IRS follow these lines: (1) the IRS does not 
want cooperatives to operate at a loss in their patronage 
activities and make up the difference with nonpatr onage 
income; (2) the IRS does not want patrons of one function 
absorbing the losses generated by another function; and (3) 
the IRS does not want patrons who were not patrons in the 
year when the loss occurred to absorb the losses generated by 
patrons of current or succeeding years [56] . 
Seve ral recent court case decisions have more or less 
followed the guidelines above; nevertheless, some exceptions 
have been recorded . In the Ford-Iroqui s case [Ford-Iroquis 
FS . Inc., 74 T. C. #88 ( 19 80)] , netting between patronage func-
tions was allowed. The fact that the members using the func-
tion were substantially the same wa s a major factor in the 
final decision . But the tax court stressed 11 that the nett ing 
of losses among patrons of a cooperative wa s a matter of 
internal management di scretion, and that the Government's 
interference wa s unwarranted 11 [33] . In the Fa rm Service case 
[Farm Se rvice Coo perative vs . Co mmi ssio ner, 619 F. 2d 718 (8 th 
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Ci r. 1980 ) ], the court approved the us e of patronage losses to 
reduce qualified eq uities issued in earlier years [56]. 
The subject of cooperative losses has had little atten-
tio n in recent years. Although losses have occurred , the 
perceived need for a systematic approach ha s been less . In 
earlier years, the majority of th e losses that did occur were 
take n from capital surplus; in many cases, the following year 
wa s a profit year. In other case s, mergers with stronger 
co operatives occurred. In a few of the more severe cases , 
losses have been allocated to members. 
Current conditions in agriculture of slow growth in 
demand, surpluses of commodities and financial pressure could 
easily result in l osses ne xt year. Many cooper a t iv es may not 
be able to reduce capital surplus again without putting their 
surplus accounts in a negative position . In order for cooper -
atives t o be able to meet the objective of enhancing member 
benefits in loss years, the board of directors must understand 
the impact on the members associated wit h each method of 
treating a loss. The overal l purpose of the work included in 
this chapter was to analyze the impact on the local coopera -
tive and its members of an ordinary net operating loss. 
Two situations we re hypothesized with respect to sources 
and magnitude of losses . In the first situation , a reg i onal 
cooperative loss was examined in conjunction with a l ocal 
cooper ative net operating savings. The magnitudes were such 
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that the combined net earnings for the local cooperative 
resulted in a loss. The second situation combined a regional 
operating loss and local operating loss that resulted in nega-
tive net local savings . Three of the case cooperatives 
described in Chapter 2 were chose n for analysis in this 
chapter . 
The ana lys is was primarily concerned with ( 1 ) the effects 
on the balance sheet of the local cooperative; (2) the distri -
bution of income to members; (3) the tax implications for the 
cooperative and the members; ( 4) how the debt to equ ity ratio 
was affected by each use of the loss; and in conclusion a 
subjective evaluation of the alternative s was given . The 
evaluation co nce ntrated on the justice and fairness t o 
members, the legal soundne ss , and the overall econom ic impacts 
associated with the alternative strategies . 
Data Used in the Analysis 
The three cooperatives used to evaluate the treatment of 
losses were the Iowa grain and marketing coo perative, the 
In diana supplies cooperative , and the small Nebraska wheat 
cooperative. Special projections were made for three years . 
The earnings patterns of the cooperatives previously postu -
late d for the earlier analyses were altered for the three 
years. The first year wa s left constant but changes wer e made 
in the proje c tion input data for two following years that 
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would cause operating losses. A summary of these changes for 
each cooperative is as follows. 
Io wa 
The basic changes made in the Iowa cooperative projection 
which lead to negative earnings were: (1) lower gross margins 
in the corn and feed departments; (2) decreases in corn and 
ferti l izer volumes of 15 percent in the second period ; 
(3) i ncreases in sal aries ; and ( 4 ) increases in other 
operat i ng expe nses. 
Indiana 
The changes in assumption which lead to combined net 
operating l osses i n the Indiana cooperative were: (1) a five 
percent decrease i n sales of supplies ; (2) lower gross margins 
in both the su pply and marketing departments; (3) increases in 
salaries of five percent; and (4) an additional five per ce nt 
increase in operating expenses in the second period . 
Nebraska 
The Nebraska cooperative was subjected to similar changes 
in assumptions . They were: (1) a 30 percent decrease in 
grain volume in the second period and a 10 perce nt decline in 
the volume of mercha ndise sold; (2) lower gross margins in the 
grain department; ( 3) increases of eight percent each year in 
salary expenses; and (4) a nine percent increase each year in 
operating expenses . 
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These assumptions are indicative of the kinds of 
pressures that these cooperatives might face in the current 
economic c limate. 
Model and Assumptions 
In order to compare the results of norma l years and loss 
years, period one was assumed to be a normal net earnings 
year for each cooperative. A normal year in this case is a 
year where both local savings and regional patronage were 
positive. In periods two and three, the local cooperatives 
were subject to losses fr om various sources and of various 
magnitudes. 
The assumptions that apply for all three periods were as 
follows: (1) depreciation was calculated on a straight-1 ine 
basis; (2) investment tax credits were earned , ( those not used 
to offset corporate taxes incurred by the cooperative were 
passed to members even in loss years); (3) no nonqual ified 
written notices of allocation were distributed; ( 4 ) a ten - year 
revolving fund existed for allocated equities; (5) the debt to 
equity ratio did not create a problem for borrowing ; (6) all 
cooperatives found it desirable to retire qualif ied a llocated 
equities; (7) the marginal income tax bracket distribution for 
the members centered at 41 percent (sce nari o 4 ) ; (8) social 
securi ty (sel f- employment tax) impacts were not calculated but 
were approximated by pushing the center of the mem ber tax 
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bracket distribution from 32 to 41 percent; (9) a substantial 
number of members either (a) had income this year; ( b ) had 
income within the past three years; or ( c) expect to have 
income in future years. 
Assumptions applying specifically to periods two and 
three are: (1) 10 percent of the loss was taken from capita l 
surplus to cover nonpatronage based loss; (2) sufficient 
qualified allocated equities existed to cover the loss ; 
(3) negati ve stock credit balances were run for new members; 
(4) equity retirement programs were suspended in loss years 
and no estates paid; ( 5) cash patronage to local members was 
not paid when net local savings were negative; (6) no 
dividends were paid on any preferred stock owned by members in 
the loss years . All other factors were held constant so that 
the results would be comparable. 
Strategies for Handling the Losses 
In period one, each of the cooperatives had positive net 
earnings . In periods two and three, the regional cooperative 
operated at a loss. Two sets of runs were completed; in the 
first set the local cooperative had positive local earnings, 
and in the second set the local cooperativ e had negative local 
earnings . Three strategies were applied to treat the losses 
for each cooperative . They were as follows: 
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Strategy A: The regional coope rative held the loss and 
decreased capital surplus. As a consequence, th e local coop-
erative did not receive a regional patronage - either po siti ve 
or negative. Without the patronage, the local cooperative had 
posi~ive local earn in gs in the first set and negative local 
earnings in the second set. 
Strategy B: The regional coo perat i ve passed the loss to 
the local cooprative in the form of a negative, noncash 
pat ronage ( i . e . the local coop's equity in the regional 
cooperative was decreased) . The patronage was subtracted fr om 
local earnings which left the . cooperative operating at a l oss . 
The local cooperative treated the loss by reducing unallocated 
capital s urplu s . In both sets of runs, the local cooperative 
had negat iv e net earnings. 
Strategy C: The regional coopera ti ve passed the l oss to 
the lo c al cooperative in the form of a negative, non cash 
patronage. The local cooperative treated the l oss i n this 
case by dist r ibuting 90 per cen t of the loss in the f orm of a 
negative, noncash patronag e refund t o its mem bers . Thi s wa s 
accomplis hed by reducing allocated member equity of the pr e -
vious year . The remaining 10 per ce nt wa s taken from capital 
surpl us to cover nonpatronage based loss . 
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Results of the Analysis 
St rategy A: the regional cooperative held the loss 
When the regional cooperative did not pass a patronage, 
two different conditions were assumed at the local level . 
First, it was assumed that the local coo perative still had 
local earnings to allocate to members . In a second set of 
conditions, it was assumed that the l ocal coo perative operated 
at a loss; therefore, there were no earnings availabl e for 
allocation to members . The results fr om application of 
Stra tegy A can be seen in Tables 5 . 1 and 5.2 . Tab le 5 . 1 
contains the data generated under the assumption th at local 
earnings were positive . Table 5 . 2 contains the data generated 
under the assumption that local earning s were negative. Fr om 
the data, it is evident that the Iowa cooperat i ve depended 
more heavily on their regional patronage. In period one , the 
patronage they received wa s $200 ,000 whi c h was grea ter than 
their local earnings of $172,500. In the Nebraska cooperative 
where the regional patronag e was only $3,000, t he impact was 
quite small compared to th eir local earnings of $110,374 . 
Therefore, when the regi onal coo perati ve did not pass a 
patronage refund, it affect ed the Iowa and Indiana cooperative 
more seriously than the Nebra ska cooperati ve . The Io wa and 
I ndiana cooperative that had been rec eiving large amounts of 
regional patronage sti ll car ried the regio na l patronage 
investment in their asset s sectio n at the origin a l level. 
Tab le 5.1 Strategy A - loss he ld wi t hin t he reg i ona l coo perati ve -
local net earn ings posit ive, set 1 
Local earnings 
Regional patronage 
Combined net earningsa 
Tot al assets 
Investment in other 
cooperatives 
Term liabilities 
Qualified equities 
Capital surplus 
Total member equity 
Taxable cash to members 
Taxable noncash to members 
ITC to members 
1 
172,500 
200,000 
372 ,500 
4,059,833 
1,156,054 
475,507 
1,854,911 
398,099 
2, 448,160 
66,243 
264 , 971 
0 
IOWA 
Period 
2 
133,241 
0 
133,241 
4,587,523 
1,156,054 
842 ,507 
1,950,844 
410,624 
2,556, 617 
23,983 
95,933 
50,621 
alncludes both regional patronage and local earnings. 
3 
164,428 
0 
164,428 
4,646,224 
1,156 ,054 
707, 00 7 
2,069,232 
426,080 
2, 690, 462 
29,597 
118, 388 
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INDIANA NEBRASKA 
Period Period 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
207,456 115,746 66,000 110, 374 16,442 16,638 
130,000 0 0 3,000 0 0 
337,456 115,746 66,000 113 , 374 16,442 16,638 
9,847,610 9,805,813 9, 827, 442 987,540 961, 013 952,130 
2,365,342 2,365,342 2,365,342 110,877 110 ,877 110, 877 
443,581 308,320 183,059 101,250 78,750 56,250 
3,983 ,418 4,066,755 4,114,275 497,639 509,447 521 ,456 
1,051,850 1,063,424 1,070,024 94,490 96,073 97,674 
5,333,348 5,428,259 5,482,379 684,007 697,428 711, 009 
95,903 20, 834 11, 880 20,407 2,960 2,995 
209 ,949 83, 337 47,520 81,630 11, 838 11, 980 
10 ,844 20,264 35,510 0 763 760 
Table 5.2 Strategy A - loss held within the regional cooperative -
local net earnings negative, set 2 
Local earnings 
Regional patronage 
Combined net earningsa 
Total as sets 
Investments in other 
cooperatives 
Term liabilities 
Qualified equities 
Capital surplus 
Total member equity 
Taxable cash to members 
Taxable noncash to members 
ITC to members 
1 
172, 150 
200,000 
372, 150 
4,059,833 
1,156,054 
475,507 
1, 854, 911 
398,099 
2,448,160 
66,243 
264, 971 
0 
IOWA 
Period 
2 
(15, 744) 
0 
(15,744 ) 
4,439,339 
1,156,054 
842,507 
1,840 , 741 
396 , 525 
2,432,416 
0 
(14, 170 ) 
52,500 
arncludes both regional patronage and local earnings . 
3 
(33,256) 
0 
(33,256 ) 
4,325 , 325 
1,156,054 
707,007 
1,810,811 
393,199 
2,399,160 
0 
(29,930 ) 
2' 500 
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INDIANA NEBRASKA 
Peri od Period 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
207 ,456 (94,924) (85 ,375 ) 110, 374 (7, 204) (8 ,134 ) 
130 ,000 0 0 3,000 0 0 
337 ,456 (94,924) (85 ,375 ) 113,374 (7 , 204) (8 ,1 34) 
9 ,84 7' 610 9,595,143 9,486,231 987,540 937,429 906, 795 
2,365,342 2, 365 ,342 2,365,342 110 , 877 110,877 110 ,877 
433,581 308,320 183 ,059 101,250 78 , 750 56,250 
3, 983 ,418 3,897 ,986 3,281,148 49 7,639 491,155 483,834 
1,051,850 1,042,358 1, 033,820 94,490 93, 770 92,957 
5,333,348 5,238,423 5,153,048 684,007 676 ,803 668 , 669 
95 ,903 0 0 20,407 0 0 
209,949 (85 ,432 ) (76 ,838) 81,630 (6,484 ) (7, 320 ) 
10 ,844 22,000 36, 500 0 1, 000 1,000 
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The qual if ied equity account, the capital surplus 
account, and therefore the total me mber equity account all 
gre w whe n l ocal earnin gs were positive . The opposite occurred 
when the local earnings were negative. Members re ceived 
taxable c ash and noncash di stri buti ons in the firs t set , but 
in the second set in periods t wo and three, 10 percent of the 
local l oss wa s ta ke n f rom capital surplus and 90 percent was 
taken fr om the qualifi ed allocated equity of members by 
allocating a negative, ta xa bl e , noncash di str ibuti on to the 
me mbers. Membe rs were entitled to a t ax deduction as a result 
of the decrease in the ir equity in the cooperativ e. They also 
receiv ed an ITC allocation . 
St rategy B: loss taken from local cooper a t ive 1 s capi ta l 
surplus 
The net re sul t of th e regional cooperative passing a 
negative patronage t o the local wa s ne gative net earnings for 
the local coo perative under both th e assumption that the local 
had positive earn ing s and t he assumption that local earnings 
were negative. Beca use the region a l patronage was larger in 
absolute terms th an the local earnings the combined net 
savi ngs wa s negati ve. Un der th e assumpti on that loca l earn -
ings wer e already negative, the regional loss simply increased 
the si ze of t he loss at the local level . Table 5. 3 and 5 . 4 
contai n the data f rom these runs. 
Table 5.3 Strategy B - loss taken from local cooperative's capital 
surplus - local net earnings positive, set 1 
Local earnings 
Regional patronage 
Combined net earningsa 
Total assets 
Investments in other 
cooperatives 
Term liabilities 
Quali fied equities 
Capital surplus 
Total member equity 
Taxable cash to members 
Taxable noncash to members 
ITC to members 
1 
172, 500 
200 ,000 
372,500 
4,059,833 
1,156,054 
475,507 
1,854,911 
398,099 
2,448,160 
66,243 
264,971 
0 
IOWA 
Period 
2 
133,241 
( 175 ,000 ) 
(41,759) 
4,413,323 
981,054 
842 , 507 
1,854,911 
356,340 
2,406,401 
0 
0 
52,500 
arncludes both regional patronage and local earnings . 
3 
164,428 
(200,000 ) 
(59,030 ) 
4,273,536 
761,054 
707,00 7 
1,854 , 911 
297,310 
2,437 ,371 
0 
0 
2, 500 
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INDIANA NEBRASKA 
Period Period 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
207 ,456 115, 746 66 ,000 110', 374 16,442 16,638 
130 ,000 (120 ' 000) (145, 000) 3,000 (20 , 000) ( 30 ,000 ) 
337,456 (4,254 ) (79,000 ) 113,374 (3,558 ) (13 ,362) 
9,847,610 9,685,814 9, 583 ' 277 987 ,540 941 ,075 905 , 213 
2,365,342 2, 245,342 2, 100 ,342 110,877 90 ,877 60 ,877 
433 ,581 308,320 183 , 059 101, 250 78,750 56 , 250 
3 , 983, 418 3,983 ,418 3,983 ,418 497,639 497,639 497 ,639 
1,051, 850 1, 047 ,596 968, 596 94,490 90,932 77 , 75 1 
5,333 , 348 5,329 , 094 5, 250,094 684,007 680 , 449 667 ,087 
95,903 0 0 20 , 407 0 0 
209,949 0 0 81 ,630 0 0 
10,844 22 , 000 36 ,500 0 1,000 1,000 
Table 5.4 Strategy B - loss taken from local cooperative's capital 
surplus - local net earnings negative, set 2 
Local earnings 
Regional patronage 
Combined net earningsa 
Total assets 
Investment in other 
cooperatives 
Term liabilities 
Qualified equities 
Capital surplus 
Total member equity 
Taxable cash to members 
Taxable noncash to members 
ITC to members 
1 
172,150 
200,000 
372,150 
4,059,833 
1,156,054 
475,507 
1,854,911 
398,099 
2,448,160 
66,243 
264' 971 
0 
IOWA 
Period 
2 
(15,744) 
(175, 000) 
(190,744) 
4,264,338 
981,054 
842,507 
1,854,910 
207 ,355 
2,257,415 
0 
0 
52 '500 
arncludes both regional patronage and local earnings . 
3 
(33 , 256) 
(220 , 000) 
(253 ,256) 
3,930,323 
761,054 
707,007 
1,854,909 
(45,900) 
2,004,158 
0 
0 
2,500 
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INDIANA NEBRASKA 
Per iod Period 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
207,456 (94,924 ) (85,375 ) 110,374 (7 , 204) (8,134 ) 
130 , 000 (120 ,000) (145, 000) 3,000 (20 ,000 ) (30,000 ) 
337,456 (2 14 , 924) (230 , 375) 113,374 (27 ,204) (38,134) 
9 ,847,610 9,475 ,144 9,221, 231 987,540 917, 429 856 , 795 
2 ,365, 342 2, 245 , 342 2,100 , 342 110,877 90 ,877 60,877 
433 , 581 308 , 320 183,059 101, 250 78,750 56,250 
3,983 , 418 3, 983 , 418 3,983 , 417 497,639 497 ,639 497 ,638 
1, 051 ,850 836 , 926 606 , 551 94,490 67,286 29,152 
5,333,348 5, 118' 424 4,888 , 048 684,007 656 ,803 618 ,669 
95, 903 0 0 20 , 407 0 0 
209 , 949 0 0 81,630 0 0 
10,844 22,000 36 , 500 0 1,000 1,000 
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In general , the total asset accounts declined from period 
one to period three because the investments in other coopera -
tives fe ll by the amount of the negative patronage. The Iowa 
coo perat ive was an e xception due to the $525,000 addition to 
fixed asse t s . Although the Iowa cooperative had an increase 
in total assets in period two, it wa s due to the large 
increase in fixed assets. The qualified equity account 
remained unchanged over the three periods . The capital 
surplus accoun t fell by the t ota l amount of the loss sustained 
in the two years . 
Under the assumption that losses occurred at t he local as 
well as the regional, the results changed some what. The 
decreases in capital surplus in the I owa coo pe rative were so 
lar ge when the local also had negative earnings that the coop -
erative had a negative capital surplus account in period three 
of - $45 ,9 00 . A negative balance in this account implies an 
attempt to "carry forward 11 the loss. Little or no difference 
in allocated member equities at the local level resulted. 
The capital surplus account for Nebraska declined almost 
60 percent from period one to three . Total member equity fel 1 
by the same amount as the decline in capital surplus . 
Although the members of all three cooperatives received no 
taxable allocation, they did receive an ITC allocation . This 
allocati on had to be passed through to the members or lost . 
The current tax code prohibits the cooperative from carrying 
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the loss forward. None of the locals was able to use ITC with 
the losses they had incurred because they had no federal tax 
liability . Member cash flow was therefore positive, regard-
less of member tax bracket under this assumption . 
Strategy C: loss taken from local member's equity 
As in Strategy B, the regional passed the loss on to t he 
local by decreasing the local •s equity in the regi onal cooper-
ative. The combined local and regional earRings at the local 
level were again negative whether or not the local was assumed 
to have earnings. Under the assumption that local earnings 
were positive, total assets a lso followed the same pattern 
that occu rred in Strategy B. The total assets again declined. 
Tables 5 . 5 and 5 . 6 contain the data that resulted from 
applying Strategy C when net earnings at the local level were 
assumed to be positive. 
However, the qualified equity account was affected 
differently by using Strategy C. In periods two and three, 
the qualified equities were reduced by 90 percent of the loss . 
Previously allocated equity of members wa s written-off the 
books, and the cooperative was no longer accountable to the 
members for retirement of that portion of equity . Under 
Strategy A or Strategy B, that equity would eventually have 
been eligible tote retired. 
Table 5.5 Strategy C - loss taken from member's allocated equity -
local net earnings positive, set 1 
Local earnings 
Regional patronage 
Combined net earningsa 
Total assets 
Investments in other 
cooperatives 
Term liabilities 
Qualified equities 
Capital surplus 
Total member equity 
Taxable cash to members 
Taxable noncash to members 
ITC to members 
1 
172, 500 
200 ,000 
372, 500 
4,059,833 
1,156,054 
475,507 
1,854,911 
398,099 
2,448,160 
66,243 
264, 971 
0 
IOWA 
Period 
2 
133, 241 
(175 ,000) 
(41,759) 
4,413,323 
981,054 
842,507 
1, 817,327 
393 , 924 
2, 406, 400 
0 
(37,583 ) 
52' 500 
3 
164,428 
(220,000) 
(59 ,030 ) 
4,273,535 
761, 054 
707,007 
1, 764 , 200 
388,021 
2,437,370 
0 
(53 , 127) 
2,500 
alncludes both regional patronage and local net earnings . 
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I ND IANA NEBRASKA 
Period Period 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
207,456 115, 746 66,000 110,374 16 , 442 16,638 
130, 000 (120, 000) (145, 000) 3,000 (20 ,000) ( 30, 000) 
337,456 (4,254) (79,000) 113, 374 (3,558) (13 , 362) 
9,847,610 9,685,814 9, 583 , 277 987,540 941,075 905 , 213 
2' 365, 342 2,245,342 2, 100 , 342 110 , 877 90 ,877 60 , 877 
433,581 308,320 183,059 101, 250 78, 750 56 ,250 
3,983 ,418 3,979,589 3, 908, 489 497 , 639 494,436 482 , 411 
1,051,850 1, 051,424 1,043,524 94,490 94,135 92 , 798 
5, 333 , 348 5, 329 , 094 5, 250,094 684 ,007 680 , 449 667 ,087 
95,903 0 0 20,407 0 0 
209,949 (3,829) (71,100) 81 , 630 (3 , 202) (12 ,025) 
0 22 , 000 36, 500 0 1, 000 1, 000 
Table 5.6 Strategy C - loss taken from member's allocated equity -
local net earnings negative, set 2 
Local earnings 
Regional patronage 
Combined net earnings* 
Total assets 
Investments in other 
cooperatives 
Term liabilities 
Qualified equities 
Capital surplus 
Total member equity 
Taxable cash to members 
Taxable noncash to members 
ITC to members 
1 
172,150 
200,000 
372,150 
4,059,833 
1,156,054 
475,507 
1,854,911 
398,099 
2,448,160 
66, 243 
264, 971 
0 
IOWA 
Period 
2 
(15,744) 
( 175, 000) 
(190,744) 
4,264,339 
981, 054 
842,507 
1,683,241 
379,025 
2,257,416 
0 
(171 ,670) 
52,500 
arncludes both regional patronage and local earnings . 
3 
(33 ,256 ) 
(220 ,000) 
(253 ,256 ) 
3,930,325 
761 ,054 
707 ,007 
1,455,311 
353,699 
2,004,160 
0 
(227 ,930) 
2,500 
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INDIANA NEBRASKA 
Period Period 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
207 ,456 (94,924) (85,375) llO, 374 (7,204) (8,134) 
130,000 (120 '000 ) (145, 000) 3,000 ( 20 , 000) ( 30, 000) 
337,456 (214,924) (230,375) 113, 374 (27 , 204) (38 ,134) 
9,847,610 9,475,144 9,221,231 987,540 917 ,429 856, 795 
2, 365, 342 2,245,342 2, 100, 342 110 ,87] 90 ,877 60,877 
433,581 308,320 183,059 101, 250 78,750 56,250 
3,983, 418 3,789,986 3, 582,648 497,639 473,155 438 ,834 
1,051,850 1,030,358 1,007,320 94,490 91, 770 87 ,957 
5,333,348 5,118,423 4,888,048 684,007 656,803 618 ,669 
95,903 0 0 20 ,407 0 0 
209,949 (193, 432) (207 ,338) 81,630 (24,484 ) (34,320 ) 
10 ,844 22,000 36, 500 0 1,000 1,000 
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Th e members received a negative taxable noncash distribu -
tion . As explained in Chapter 3 , the members were entitled to 
use the noncash loss to reduce ordinary income because taxes 
were paid when the equity was allocated, the IRS recognizes it 
as an ordinary l oss . No taxable cash di stri bution was given. 
However , an ITC allocation equal to the one distributed in 
Strategy B was received by the members. 
The unallocated capital surplus account declined when 
Strategy C wa s used to treat the l oss . But it fell by only 10 
percent of the combi ned loss for the local cooperative . This 
reduction wa s made to account for the portion of the loss due 
to nonpatron sourced bus iness . Thus, under either the assump-
tio n that the local cooperative had positive net savings or 
sustained a local net loss, the outcome for major financial 
accounts moved in the same direction . The impact on farmer 
cash flow also moved in th e same direction. The magnitude of 
these cha nges in cooperative accounts and farmer cas h flo w 
was greater under the assumption that a l ocal loss occurred as 
well as the one passed from the regional. 
Detailed Analysis of Loss Distribution 
The analysis that follows is a detailed comparison of 
Strategie s A, B and C for handling losses that origi nated at 
a regional or local cooperative . The three cooperatives that 
were used in this section responded in differing degrees 
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depending on the importance of the regional patronage to the 
cooperative . As mentioned in the previous section , the Iowa 
cooperative received more from the regional cooperative than 
the cooperative generated locally. Consequently, when no 
patronage was received from the regional cooperative or when a 
negative patronage was handed down to the Iowa cooperative the 
impact was greater on it than in the other cooperatives . For 
this reason, the Iowa cooperative wa s chosen as the primary 
focus of the analysis. A short analysis of the impacts on the 
Indiana and the Nebraska cooperatives wa s included to provide 
insight int o the impacts that losses will have on other types 
of cooperatives. 
Analysis of the Impacts of the Iowa Cooperative 
Earning s 
The Iowa cooper ativ e generated local earnings of $133,241 
and $164,428 in periods 2 and 3, respectively (Table 5.7 ) . As 
long as the regional loss was held at the regional coopera -
tive, the local cooperative functioned as usual. The combined 
net earnings wa s less than normal. Nonetheless, the local was 
obligated to distribute patronage dividends to members and t o 
pay cash on the allocated earnings at the minimum rate of 20 
percent if the allocation wa s qualified. As an alternative 
they could retain earnings into unallocated surplus or issue 
nonqualified allocations. In either of these cases, taxes 
Table 5.7 Iowa - local net savings postive - set 1 
Earnings (local) 
Regional patronage 
Total assets 
Term liabilities 
Taxable cash to 
members 
Taxable noncash to 
members 
ITC to members 
Total tax 
(scenario 4) 
Total tax 
(scenario 5) 
Qualified equities 
Capita l surplus 
Corporate tax 
(after ITC) 
Total member equity 
Debt/equity ratio 
Period 1 
172, 500 
200 ,000 
4,059,833 
475, 507 
66,243 
264, 971 
0 
112,049 
127,153 
1,854,911 
398,099 
619 
2,448,160 
.15 
Loss held 
at 
regional 
133, 241 
0 
Period 2 
Loss taken 
from local 
capital 
surplus 
133,241 
(175 ,000) 
4,587,523 4,413,323 
842, 507 
23,983 
95,933 
50,621 
46,568 
842,507 
0 
0 
52,500 
0 
46 ,036 0 
1,950,844 1,854,911 
410,624 356,340 
0 0 
2,556,617 2,406,401 
. 33 . 35 
Loss taken 
from 
member 
equity 
133,241 
(175,000) 
4,413,323 
842,507 
0 
(37,583) 
52,500 
(14,714) 
(14, 428) 
1,817,327 
393,924 
0 
2,406,400 
.35 
Loss held 
at 
regional 
164,428 
0 
Period 3 
Loss taken 
from local 
capital 
surplus 
164,428 
(220,000) 
4,646,224 4,273,536 
707,007 707,007 
29,597 
118, 388 
182 
50, 063 
56, 811 
0 
0 
2,500 
0 
0 
2,069,232 1,854,911 
426 ,080 297 , 310 
637 0 
2,690,462 2,437,371 
. 26 . 30 
Loss taken 
from 
member 
equity 
164,428 
(220,000) 
4,273,535 
707,007 
0 
(53,127) 
2,500 
(17,973) 
(20,395) 
1,764,200 
388,021 
0 
2,437,370 
.30 
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would have to be paid. The situation changed when the 
regional cooperative passed the loss t o the Iowa cooperative . 
Their local earnings were not large enough to offset the large 
negative distributions of -$175,000 and -$220 , 000 from the 
regional. Therefore, co mbined net earnings were - $41,759 and 
- $55 , 572 in periods two and three , respectively . Both 
Strategies B and C resulted in the same net earnings situation 
for the local . In both cases, the members did not receive a 
positive taxabl e distribution. 
Table 5 . 8 contains the results under the assumption that 
the Iowa coo perative had negative local earnings. The magni -
tude of the los s was much greater . In peri ods two and three , 
the combined net earnings were -$19 0 , 744 and - $253,256, 
respectively . The cooperative was faced with a situation much 
different from period one wh en the combined net earnings were 
$372,500. 
Total assets 
The t otal asset account fell i n period three by the 
amount of the negative regional patrona ge when Strategies B 
and C were used . In period two , the cooperative inve sted in a 
$525,000 elevator . Hence, the total assets increased . 
Investments in other cooperatives, an asset account , was 
composed of the equity that the Iowa coo perative held in other 
cooperatives ( usually the regional cooperatives) . Within the 
Table 5.8 Iowa - local net savings negative - set 2 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
Loss taken Loss taken Loss taken Loss taken 
Loss held from 1oca1 from Loss held from 1oca1 from 
at capita 1 member at capita 1 member 
regional sur~lus equiti'. regional suq~ 1 us egu i tt 
Earning s (local) 172 , 500 (15,744) (15,744) (15,744) (33, 256) (33,256) (33, 256) 
Regional patronage 200 ,000 0 (175,000) (175,000) 0 (220,000) (220 ,000) 
Total as sets 4,059,833 4,439,339 4,264,338 4,264,339 4, 325 ,325 3,930,323 3,930 ,325 
Term liabilities 475,507 842 , 507 842, 507 842,507 707,007 707,007 707 ,007 
Taxable cash to 
members 66, 243 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Taxable noncash to ,_. 
members 264, 971 (14,170) 0 (171,670) (29, 930 ) 0 (227 ,930) co 
-....J 
ITC to member s 0 52,500 52,500 52 , 500 2,500 2,500 2, 500 
Total tax 
(scenar io 4) 112, 049 (4,794) 0 (58 ,076 ) (10,125) 0 (77,109) 
Total tax 
(scenar i o 5) 127 ,153 (5 ,440) 0 (65 , 904) (11,490) 0 (87 , 502) 
Qualif i ed equities 1, 854, 911 1,840,741 1,854,910 1,683, 241 1,810,811 1, 854,909 1,455,311 
Capital surplus 398,099 396,525 207,355 379 , 025 393,160 (45,900) 353,699 
Corporate tax 
(after ITC) 619 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tota l member equity 2,448,160 2,432,416 2,257,415 2, 257 ,41 5 2,399,160 2, 004 ,158 2,004,160 
Debt/equity ratio .15 .35 . 37 .37 . 29 . 35 .35 
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regional cooperative, the loss was written-off by decreasing 
the allocated equity accounts of its member cooperatives. In 
order to reflect the loss in equity, the Iowa cooperative 
decreased i ts investments in other cooperatives. As a result, 
assets fell in period three from $4,413,323 to $4,273,535. 
When the loss was held at the regional and t aken from 
capital surplus, there was no reflection of the loss on the 
Iowa cooperative. Investments in other cooperatives did not 
change. Therefore, assets grew over the three year period 
from $4,059,833 to $4,646,244 under the assumption that the 
Iowa cooperative had positive earnings with no allocation from 
the regional, assets increased only slightly when the local 
cooperative had negative local earnings. ( Again, the addi-
tions to fixed assets caused some of the increase . ) 
Growth in assets is normally considered to be a desir-
able sign . This is especially true when the growth is backed 
by equity rather than debt. However, it is important in this 
case to examine the situation carefully. Regardless of 
whether the investment account in the Iowa cooperative had 
fallen or not, the fact remained that the regional cooperative 
in which the Iowa cooperative had equity, had suffered a 
l 0 s s . 
The true value of that equity had declined. It would be 
very misleading to look at a local cooperative's balance sheet 
as an accurate indi c ation of net worth if this process were to 
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be continued for several periods . The asset account may no 
longer reflect face value because the regional cooperative's 
net worth would be lower. Those lending to the local coopera-
tives may become skeptical in making loans if the local coop -
erative 1 s assets appeared to be overvalued as a result of the 
regional losses. Eventually a nonqualified opinion audit 
would not be possible without ''writing down" this value. 
Capital surplus 
The capital surplus account is seriously affected as a 
result of the methods chosen of allocating the l oss because 
each method handles unallocated capital surplus differently . 
The Iowa cooperative provides a c lear picture of what wou ld 
happen to some cooperatives if they incur losses several years 
in a row . 
The capital surplus account increa sed only when the 
regional cooperative held the l oss and the local cooperative 
had positive earnings. Ten percent of the after - ta x local 
earnings were placed in the ca pital surplus account each year 
so that by the third period the capital surplus account had 
increased from $398, 000 to $426,080 . The increases were small 
relative to previous years, nonetheless capital surplus 
increased . When the local earnings were negative and the 
regional held the loss, the decrease i n the account was rela -
tively sma ll. 
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As was mentioned earlier, by using Strategy B the entire 
loss was taken out of the local capital surplus account . 
Because the loss was so large, it resulted in a substantial 
decrease in the local capital surplus account . When the local 
cooperative had positive net earnings, capital surplus 
declined from $398 , 099 to $297,310 after loss periods two and 
three. In two years, the reserves had fallen by $100,000. 
The impact was much greater when it was assumed that the 
local cooperative operated at a loss also . The capital 
surplus account fell 50 percent from period one to period two, 
and went negative from pe_riod two to period three . The losses 
were so substa ntial that by period three capital surplus was 
-$45,900 . It was obvious that t he cooperative could not 
continue in this manner . 
The unallocated capital surplus account reflected a 
smaller portion of the loss when Strategy C was applied. 
Capital surplus declined in periods two and three, but only by 
10 percent of the loss. When earnings were positive at the 
local level, the capital surplus account declined by $4,176 
and $5,557 in periods two and three, respectively. When local 
earnings were assumed to be negative, capital surplus fell by 
$19,674 and $25,326 in periods two and three, respectively. 
Although not desirable , the decrease was not enough in any 
period to cause alarm . 
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There are two major problem associated with decreas i ng 
the capital su rplus account (es pec i ally to the e xtent that it 
fell by us i ng Strategy B) . First, it leaves the cooperative 
with the liability to retire equities that have been los t in 
reali t y . Second, current patro ns would not be the only ones 
who would absorb the loss. Patrons of previous year s and 
(mo re important) patron s of future ye ars are the ones wh o will 
have to absorb the loss . 
The att i tude of the IRS to wards this ki nd of arrangement 
has already been discu ssed in the first sectio n of this 
chapter. The IRS strongly believes in the "prin c ip le of 
equitable allocatio n", that is, "the patron s should sh are in 
the savings produced by their busines s in proportion to each 
member ' s activities with the cooperativ e " [56]. 
Qualified equity 
Qualified equity, like capital surplus , only grew in one 
circ umstance . Whe n it was assumed that the local cooperative 
had positive earni ngs and the regio nal use d St rategy A (loss 
held at the regi onal ) , the allocated equities increased over 
the three peri ods fr om $1, 85 4,911 to $2 , 096 , 232 . When the 
local los s was ass umed using St rategy A, qualified equities 
fell by 90 percent of the l ocal loss in each period. This 
reduction represented t he passing t o members of the local 
portion of the loss. 
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Since the capital surp lus account was decreased by the 
entire amount of the combined local net earnings under 
Strategy B, the qualified equity account remained unchanged 
over the three years. This result occurred whether local 
earnings were positive or negative. The greatest change in 
qualified equities occurred in Strategy C. In each period, 
qualified equities fell by 90 percent of the combined net 
local earnings. In set one, the qualified account fell from 
$1,854,911 to $1,764,200 after the third peri od. In set two, 
the decline was larger because the combined losses were 
larger. Qualified equities fell from $1,854,911 to $1,455,311 
over the three periods. 
Treating losses in this manner has received IRS approval 
and the tax court approval in the Farm Service case cited 
earlier in the chapter. Patrons were allocated the loss in 
proportio n to the business they did wi th the cooperative dur-
ing the year the loss occurred . 
treated just like a gain . 
In this manner, a loss is 
It is i mport an t at this point to stress that the same 
principle was applied earlier when the regional cooperative 
decreased the local cooperative's equity in the regional. If 
the loss is taken from capital surplus instead of allocated 
equity at the local level there is no reflection on the 
member's balance sheet . Hence, the member carries an i nvest-
ment at face value despite the fact a loss has occurred and 
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the investments may be of lower value.1 If losses are rela-
tively h igh , farmer equity in the cooperative would no lo nger 
be worth the face value that appears on their balance sheet. 
For this reason, the los s should be reflected in their net 
worth. 
Stock in a cooperative is not sold on the open market. 
Therefore, the value of the stock may not fluctuate to reflect 
the losses that were taken from capital surplus. One wa y to 
compensate for the lack of an equity pricing mechanism (fo r 
allocated cooperative equities) is to pass the loss to the 
members by decreasing the amount of equity they have in the 
cooperative. In this way members would not be misled as to 
the value of their investment in the cooperative and the 
financial po si tion of the cooperative. 
Total taxes 
Other benefits to members were documented when los ses 
were passed to members. Members were required to report and 
pay taxes on qualified allocated equities at the time these 
were received as ordinary income. Therefore, when the cooper-
ative chose to decrease allocated equities to account for the 
1 Although a case could be made that members frequ ently 
do not use cooperative equities in the process of calculating 
net worth, ample eviden ce exists that when they cease to do 
business wit h the cooperative they do expect to receive equity 
from the cooperative. 
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loss, the members were entitled to report the reduction in 
equity as an ordinary loss. 
If the Iowa cooperative had a distribution of members 
simil ar to scenario 4 in Ch ap ter 2, the members (collec ti vely) 
would have received $12,714 in period two and $17,973 in 
period three on their taxable noncash allocations of -$ 37,583 
in period two and - $53 , 127 i n period th ree (set one). If the 
average tax bracket of members had been higher (scenario 5) 
then members would have received $14,428 and $20,395 in tax 
savings . Under the assumption that the cooperative had 
sustained a loca l loss, the amount of tax deductions were much 
greater. A member tax bracket distribution such as scenario 5 
would have entitled members to $65,904 in period two. This 
positive cash flow wa s based on the member's noncash loss of 
$171,670 . In period three, the cash flow would have been 
$87,502 on the member's taxable noncash loss (equity 
reduction) of $227,930. 
When St rat egy A (holding losses at the regional) was used 
instead of Strategy B, members wou ld pay approximately $46,000 
in taxes if the local cooperative had positive earnings. In 
set two, the members would receive a small tax savings as a 
result of the local loss. Treating the loss by reducing local 
capital surplus resulted in no taxable noncash distribution to 
members . Therefore, members were not entitled to any tax 
deduction . 
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The apparent results show that the coop erative would not 
pay any federal taxes. But si nce the extent t o which a 
cooperative can carry the loss forward or backward to offset 
income of previous or future year s i s open to question, the 
extra tax benef i t from the loss might be lost [33] . Hence, 
these apparent results may overstate the financial position of 
the cooperative if an unfav orable ruling from IRS did actually 
result. 
Net cash flow to members 
Further analysis of the tax reductions through ordinary 
losses to members is nece ssary s in ce greater net cash flow is 
a desirable result . Table 5 . 9 gives the net cash flow t o 
members for every $1 of distribution they receive from each 
method of allocation. Two tax brackets were selected in order 
to represent the net cash flow of members in both a lo w and a 
high average tax bracket. 
Table 5 . 9 is usefu l in illustrating when members have 
positive or negative net cash flow. The negative signs indi -
cate negative net cash flow for members in that tax bracket . 
There ar e li mitations t o th is method of presenting cash flow 
information . Large positive numbers do not neces sarily imply 
that large amounts of cash are being distributed to members. 
For example, in periods two and three using Strategy B, the 
members received $1 . 0/$1 distribution. Their distribution is 
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Table 5.9 Iowa net cash fl ow to members per dollar distribution 
Positive local earnings - set 1 
Strategy A - loss held 
at the regional 
Strategy B - loss taken 
from local capital surplus 
Strategy C - loss taken 
from member equities 
Negative local earnings - set 2 
Strategy A - los s held 
at the regional 
Strategy B - loss taken 
from local capital surplus 
Strategy C - loss taken 
from member equities 
41 percent 
tax bracket 
Year 
1 -2- 3 
23 percent 
tax bracket 
Year 
1 -2- 3 
-.208 .149 -.209 -. 028 . 276 -.029 
-.208 1.0 1.0 - . 028 1.0 1.0 
-. 208 . 754 .437 - .028 .679 . 265 
-.208 .875 . 455 -.028 .836 . 289 
-.208 1.0 1.0 -. 028 1. 0 1. 0 
-. 208 .548 .416 -.028 .410 .238 
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100 percent cash, but the distribution is entirely ITC that 
the cooperative could not use . In period two, the ITC was 
$52,000 and in period three it was only $2 ,5 00 yet the cash 
flow per dollar of distribution is the same for both periods . 
When local earnings were assumed to be positive, all the 
members received positive net cash flow in period two 
regardless of tax bracket. But the amount of cash flow 
depends on the strategy employed. Table 5.10 shows total 
dollar cash flow to members. Strategy A resulted in $25,41 0 
to members, Strategy B resulted in $52,500 to members and 
Strategy C resulted in $67,923 to members of the 41 percent 
tax bracket . 2 Because the regional held the loss in 
Strategy A, the local cooperative had a tax liability on its 
local earnings. The ITC was used to defray tax liabilities at 
the cooperative level. Consequently only a small amount of 
ITC was available to pass to members. Thus, the ITC was used 
to offset tax liabilities on local earnings when those 
earnings could have been offset by the regional loss . 
In period three , members in marginal tax brackets above 
23 percent were in a negative net cash flow position (Tab le 
5.11) . Members' net cash flow as a result of Strategy A was 
-$30,967, but with Strategy C members received $24,308 in net 
2calculated by taking the total distribution for each 
method times the net cash flow/$1 distribution . 
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Table 5.10 Total cash flow to members, 41 percent tax bracket 
PER IOO 
Strategy A - loss held 
at the regional 
Strategy B - loss taken 
from local capital surplus 
Strategy C - loss taken 
from member equities 
Assuming local 
earnings positive 
2 3 
$25,410 $ ( 30' 967) 
52,500 2,500 
67,923 24,308 
Assuming 1oca1 
earnings negative 
2 3 
$58,336 $14,756 
52,500 2,500 
122,845 95,859 
Tab le 5 . 11 Net cash flow to member s per do ll ar distribut i on 
Marginal bracket 
percent tax 20 23 26 29 32 35 38 41 44 47 50 
Net cas h flow/$ 
distribution .001 -.029 -.059 -. 089 - .119 -.149 - . 179 -. 209 - . 238 - . 268 - . 298 
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cash flow. Thus, an absolute difference of more than $55,000 
in cash f l ow resulted. Again, the ITC was used at the 
cooperative level to offset the taxes as a result of local 
earnings under Strategy A. 
Under the assumption that local losses occurred, the 
members had positive net cash flow in both peri ods two and 
three due to the local loss and the tax deduction . In period 
two, those members in the 41 percent tax bracket would have 
received $58,336 from Strategy A, $52,000 from Strategy B, and 
$122,845 from Strategy C. 
Strategy C provided the largest positive net cash flow to 
the members . Whether it was assumed that local earnings were 
positive or negative, the members were in a positive cash flow 
position in both periods two and three. The net cash flow 
that members received was larger using Strategy C than 
Strategy A in set two. The tax reduction was only $4, 794 
( scenario 4) using Strategy A. Using Strategy C, t he s avings 
were $58,076 . 
Despite the positive cash flow impacts, trade-off was 
involved. The members, as a group, lost more nominal eq uity 
by using Strategy C than in Strategy A. In additi on to the 
positive net cash flow from the decrease in equities, members 
need to consider the time value of money . The trade-off 
reduces to a question of whether the ta x deduct ion today is 
more valuable than the face value of the equity to be retired 
201 
in the future . One way to determine the value of the tax 
deduction is to calculate the discounted va lue of th e gain 
(t ax deduction ) using rates that appr oximate the opp ort unity 
cost of the foregone future earnings ( equity retired in the 
future). By compar in g current net ca s h flow to the present 
value of the flow antic ipa ted from futur e equity retire men t, 
the trade-off can be qualified . 
The number of years ca lculated to break even may be 
co mpared to the number of years it takes a coo perativ e to 
revolve its equities . If the break-even number of yea rs is 
less than the number of year s to revol ve equity , then it would 
clearly be to the member ' s advantage to take a loss in qual i -
fied equ i ties and the ass ociated tax deduction . 3 Table 5 .1 2 
gives the length of the revolv i ng peri ods necessary to break -
even at different dis co un t rates and for memb ers in different 
average tax brackets. Th e number of years appears t o be high 
but the calcu l at i ons wer e not adjusted t o ac co unt for soc ial 
security ta xes . 
Whether or not the cooper ative ha s a spec ifi c plan to 
re tire equities us i ng St r at egy B - takin g the loss fr om 
3Under the co ndit ions of running a negative cap ital 
s urplus balance at the regi onal or lo ca l level , thi s t est may 
not pr ovide unambiguou s results . If breakeven number of years 
is greater than the rev olving period and negative su r plus 
balances are run this may im ply that the coopera ti ve would not 
be in a po sition to ma in t ain the expected revolving period . 
Rathe r a l ong er period would be ne cessary . 
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Table 5. 12 Length of revolving period (i n year s) necessary to 
equalize current cash flow with face value of equitiesa 
Average 
tax Discount rate 
bracket .08 . 10 .12 . 14 
20% 19.5 15 . 5 13 . 0 11. 5 
26% 17.0 14 . 0 12 .0 10 . 0 
29% 16. 0 13.0 11.0 9.5 
35% 14. 0 11. 5 9. 5 8. 0 
41% 12 . 5 10 .0 8.5 7. 5 
aq = 37, 583, 
PVt = Q , 
(l+i )n 
Q = qualified allocation, 
PVt = total tax savings for average tax bracket, 
i = discount rate, and 
n = number of years. 
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cap ital surplus - is li kely to lengthen the number of years to 
revolve equity. Replenishinq a negative capit al surp l us would 
use funds that might have been a potential source for eq ui ty 
redemption . 
Debt to equity and return on mem ber equity 
In order to analyze these ratios , the impacts on t otal 
member equity and debt was examined . Strategy A resulted in 
greater total member equity than eithe r Strategy B and 
Strategy C. Both Stra t egies B and C generated the same t otal 
member equity . This re sult occurred because the loss was 
allocated to an equity account in both cases . Debt was held 
cons tant . Therefore , the debt to equity ratio fro m app l ying 
st rategies B and C were the same . Likewise, the return on 
member equity was the same . 
. Since total member equity was greater under Strategy A 
than under Strategy B or C, the Strategy A debt to equity 
ratios ar e greater . 
Table 5 . 13 shows the debt to equity ratio for the Iowa 
cooperative for all these strategies . Table 5.14 s hows th e 
return on member equity from using the three strategies. If 
lo wer debt to eq uity is desirable , the apparent results f rom 
Strategy A are substantially better than the results f or 
Stra te gies B and C. However , the results in Strategy A, in a 
sense , conceal the true condition of the cooperati ve . The 
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Table 5.13 Iowa - long term debt to member equity 
Positive local earni ng s - set 1 
Strategy A - loss held 
at the regional 
Strategy B - 19ss taken 
from local capital surplus 
Strategy C - loss taken 
from member equities 
Set 1 - local 
earnings positive 
Periods 
1 2 3 
.19 .33 .26 
.19 . 35 . 30 
. 19 .35 . 30 
Set 2 - local 
earnings negative 
Periods 
1 2 3 
.19 . 35 .29 
. 19 .37 . 35 
.19 . 37 .35 
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Table 5. 14 Iowa - return on member equity 
Positive local earni ngs - set 1 
Strategy A - loss held 
at the regional 
Strategy B - loss taken 
from local capital surplus 
Strategy C - loss taken 
from member equities 
Set 1 - local 
earnings positive 
Periods 
1 2 3 
15 .2 5.21 6 . 11 
15.2 - 1. 74 -2.51 
15.2 - 1. 74 -2.51 
Set 2 - local 
earnings negative 
Periods 
1 2 3 
15.2 -. 65 -2. 36 
15.2 -8. 45 -12.64 
15.2 -8.45 -1 2.64 
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loss that occu rred at the regional cooperative was not 
reflected i n these ratio s . Hence , they might present a false 
sense of financial well-be ing in t he local cooperative and 
se rve t o delay needed financia l decisions that shou ld be mad e. 
The misleading results are particular ly dan ge rou s if the 
coop erat ive uses nominal equity in the regi on al co op erative as 
a bargaining tool with lenders. 
Working capital 
The last element of concern in the Iowa cooperative was 
the impac~ on worki ng capital as a result of the treat me nt of 
the loss . In all of the cases, the working c apita l grew over 
the three periods. The only difference in the three strate -
gies wa s under St rategy A (t he lo ss wa s not passed to the 
local) und er the assumption that the local had positive 
earni ng s . Und er these circumsta nces, working capital wa s less 
than working c ap it al generated in the other strategies . The 
coo perative paid 20 percent cas h patronag e to me mbers and paid 
taxes on the portion put into capital surplus . Under 
Strategies B and C, less cas h was paid to members and less 
taxes wer e paid on th e addition to unallo cated surplus . Table 
5.15 contains the wor king ca pital ge nerated by th e three 
strategies . 
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Table 5. 15 Iowa - working capital 
Strategy A: 
loss held 
at the 
region a 1 
Strategy B: 
loss taken from 
local capital 
Set 1 
local earnings positive 
Period 
1 2 3 
663,168 735 ,324 834,699 
surplus 663,168 760,108 886,608 
Strategy C: 
loss taken from 
member equities 663,168 760 ,108 886 ,608 
Set 2 
local earnings negative 
Period 
1 2 3 
663,168 611,123 543,39 7 
663,168 611,1 23 543,397 
663,168 611,123 543,395 
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Results in the Indiana and Nebraska Cooperatives 
The data generated from applying St rategies A, B, and C 
on the Indiana cooperative are given in Tables 5. 16 and 5.17. 
The Indiana cooper ative was in better financial condition to 
cope with the absence of a regional patronage . Their local 
earnings were $207,456 in period one and their regional 
patronage was only $130,000. Under the assump t ion that local 
earnings were positive in period two, the regional passed 
-$1 20,000 which left combined local earnings at - $4,254. 
In period three set one, combined local earnings were 
- $79 , 000. Under the assumption that local losses occurred in 
period s two and three, the combined loss was - $214,294 in 
period two and $230,375 in period three . 
The results of allocating the losses are consistent with 
those from the Io wa cooperative . The capital surplus account 
in particular was reduced substantially by using Strategy B 
when both local and regional losses occurred. If Strategy C 
had been used under these circumstances, the members wou ld 
have shared $79,597 in tax deductions (sc enario 5), or $70,142 
in sce nario 4. 
The Nebraska cooperat ive behaved in the same way as the 
previous two cooperatives. In set one, combine d local 
earnings were - $3,558 and -$13,362 in periods two and three, 
respectively. The l osses i n set two were - $27,204 and 
-$38,134 . Although the magnitude of the losses was much 
Tab le 5 .16 Indiana - local net earnings positive - set 1 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
Loss taken Loss taken Loss taken Loss taken 
Loss held from loca 1 from Loss Held from local from 
at capital member at capital member 
regional sur~lus egu i tl'. regional sur~lus egui tl'. 
Earnings (lo ca 1) 207 ,456 115, 746 115, 746 115,746 66,000 66,000 66,000 
Regional patronage 130,000 0 (120,000) (120, 000) 0 (1 45,000) (145,000) 
Total assets 9,847,610 9, 805 , 813 9,685,814 9,685 ,814 9,827 , 442 9, 583,277 9,583,276 
Term liabilities 433,581 308,320 308,320 308,320 183,059 183,059 183 ,059 
Taxable cash to 
members 95,903 20 ,834 0 0 11,880 0 0 
Taxable noncash to N 
members 209 ,949 83 ,337 0 (3,829) 47,520 0 ( 71, 100) C> l.O 
ITC to members 10,844 20 , 264 22,000 22,000 35, 510 36 , 500 36,500 
Total tax 
(scenario 4) 103,470 35 , 241 0 (1,295) 20 ,095 0 (24 ,053) 
Total tax 
(seen ar i o 5) 117,416 39,991 0 (1, 4 70) 22,804 0 ( 27 ,295) 
Qualified equities 3,983,418 4,066,755 3,983,418 3,979,589 4' 114, 275 3,983,418 3,908,489 
Cap ital surplus 1,051,850 1,063,424 1,047,596 1,051,424 1,070,024 968, 596 1,043,524 
Corporate tax 
(after ITC) 619 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total member equity 5,333,348 5,428,259 5,329,094 5,329,093 5,482,379 5,250,094 5,250,093 
Debt/equity ratio .08 . 057 . 058 .058 .033 .035 .035 
Table 5.17 Indiana - local net earnings negative - se t 2 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
Loss taken Loss taken Loss taken Loss taken 
Loss held from 1oca1 from Loss held from local from 
at capi ta 1 member at capita l member 
regional suq~ lus eguiti'. regional SUrQlUS eguiti'. 
Earn in gs ( loca l ) 207 ,456 (94, 294) (94,294) (94, 294) (85,375) (85 ,3 75) ( 85 , 375) 
Regional patronage 130,000 0 (120,000) (120 ,000) 0 (145, 000) (145 ' 000) 
Total assets 9,847 ,610 9,595,143 9,475,144 9,475,144 9,486,231 9,221 , 231 9,221,231 
Term li abilities 433,581 308 , 320 308,320 308 , 320 183 , 059 183 ,059 183 ,059 
Taxable cash to 
members 95,903 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Taxable noncash t o N 
members 209 ,949 (85 ,432) 0 (193, 432) ( 76 ,838) 0 (207 , 338) ........ 0 
ITC to members 10, 844 22 , 000 22 ,000 22,000 36,500 36 , 500 36 ,500 
Total tax 
(scenar io 4) 103, 470 (28 , 901) 0 (65 ,438) (25 , 994) 0 (70, 142) 
Total tax 
(scenario 5) 117 ,416 ( 32 , 797) 0 ( 74, 258) (29 , 498) 0 ( 79 , 597) 
Qualified equities 3, 983,418 3, 897 ,986 3,983 ,418 3,789,986 3, 281,148 3, 983 ,417 3,582 ,648 
Capital surp l us 1,051,850 1,042, 358 836,926 1,030,358 1,033 ,820 606 , 551 1,007 , 320 
Corporate tax 
(after ITC) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total member equity 5, 333,348 5, 238 ,423 5, 118, 424 5,118 ,423 5, 153,048 4, 888 , 048 4, 888, 048 
Debt/equity ratio . 08 . 59 .60 .60 . 36 . 38 .38 
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smaller than in the Iowa and Indiana cooperatives, the results 
are still consistent with their results. The data generated 
from the Nebraska cooperative are given in Tables 5 . 18 and 
5 • 1 9 • 
Overall Evaluati on 
Fairness and justice to members 
In order to evaluate the methods of allocating losses 
used in this chapter , the theory behind cooperative activity 
must be reviewed . Ladd's conclusion that, 'the goal of the 
cooperativ e should be to maximize net member benefits' will be 
used as the assumed objective for the cooperative firm. [40] 
The net member benefits criterion is assumed to include 
members from the past who still have equity in the coopera -
tive, the present members, and members who join the coopera-
tive in the future . In the years of positive earnings, 
members receive a distribution of earnings based on the level 
of patronage with the cooperative in the last year . The 
practice of retaining equity allocated and revolving out 
previous equity is well-established . This helps to ensure 
tha t cu rrent patrons are financing the cooperative . 
Though management may be reluctant to apply it, the fair-
ness principle should apply when a cooperative has an operat -
ing loss . The loss in most cases is a result of the current 
patrons' business. In some manner they must be willing t o 
Table 5.18 Nebraska - local net earnings positive - set 1 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
Loss taken Loss taken Loss taken Loss taken 
Loss held from local from Loss held from local from 
at capital member at capital member 
regional suq:~ lu s eguity r eg ional s uq~lu s egui tl'. 
Earnings ( local) 110,374 16,442 16,442 16,442 16,638 16,638 16,638 
Regional patronage 3,000 0 (20 ,000) (20 ,000) 0 (30 ,000) (30 ,000) 
Total assets 987 , 540 961,013 941,075 941 ,075 952 ,130 905,213 905,213 
Term liabilities 101,250 78,750 78,750 78,750 56,250 56,250 56 ,250 
Tax ab le cash to 
members 20,407 2,960 0 0 2,995 0 0 
Taxable noncash to N 
members 81,630 11,838 0 (3,202) 11, 980 0 (12,025) 1--' 
N 
I TC to members 0 763 1,000 1,000 760 1,000 1,000 
Total tax 
(scenario 4) 34 , 519 5,006 0 (1, 083) 5,066 0 ( 4, 068) 
Total tax 
(scenario 5) 39,172 5,681 0 (1, 229) 5, 749 0 (4,617) 
Qualified equities 497,639 509,447 497,639 494,436 521,456 497,639 482, 411 
Capita l surplus 94,490 96, 073 90 , 932 94,135 97,674 77. 571 92,798 
Corporate tax 
(after ITC) 637 0 0 0 240 0 0 
Total member equity 684,007 697,428 680,449 680,449 711 ,009 667,087 667 ,087 
Debt/eq ui ty ratio .15 .11 .12 .12 .08 .084 .084 
Table 5. 19 Nebr ask a - 1oca1 net earn ings negative - set 2 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
Loss taken Loss taken Loss t aken Loss taken 
Loss held from 1oca1 from Loss held from 1oca1 from 
at capita 1 member at capital member 
regi ona l SUr QlUS egu i t}'. regional SUrQ l US egui ti'. 
Earnings ( local) 110,374 (7 , 204) (7 , 204) (7,204) (8 , 134) (8, 134) (8 , 134) 
Regional patronage 3, 000 0 (20 , 000) (20 ,000) 0 (30 ,000) (30 ,000) 
Total assets 987,540 937, 429 917,429 917 ,429 906 , 795 856 , 795 856 , 795 
Term l i ab i lities 101, 250 78 , 750 78 , 750 78 , 750 56 , 250 56 , 250 56 , 250 
Taxab le cash to 
members 20 , 407 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Taxable noncash to N 
members 81, 630 (6,484) 0 (24 ,484) (7 , 320) 0 (34 , 320) ....... w 
ITC to members 0 1, 000 1,000 1, 000 1,000 1, 000 1,000 
Total tax 
{ seen ar i o 4) 34,519 (2,194) 0 (8 , 283) (2,476) 0 (11 , 611) 
Tota l tax 
(scenario 5) 39 , 172 (2,489) 0 (9 ,399) (2 ,810) 0 (13,176) 
Qualified equities 497,639 491,155 497 , 639 473,155 483,834 497 ,638 438 ,834 
Capital surplus 94 ,490 93 ' 770 67 , 286 91, 770 92 , 957 29 ,152 87 , 957 
Corporate tax 
(after ITC) 637 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total member equity 684,007 676,803 656,803 656,803 668 , 669 618 ,669 618 ,669 
Debt/equity ratio .15 .11 . 12 .12 . 08 .09 . 09 
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accept the consequences. Although the net cash flow to 
members was positive in all cases , a reduction in future 
equity claims resulted when the local members received an 
allocated loss . If a cooperative has been allocating quali -
fied equities, the members have been paying the taxes . The 
cash flow merely represent s an adjustment f or these tax 
payments . 
When a loss occurs and the capital surplus is reduced, 
the cooperative may successfu l ly carry forward the loss 
thr ough negative capit a l surplus. In the event this is not 
allowed by IRS , potential use of the loss as an offset to 
ordinary income is lo s t . 
If the loss is passed to the members, they can be compen -
sated for some of the taxes they have paid in previous years. 
The same principle applies in the situation between the local 
cooperative and the regional cooperative . If the regional 
cooperative holds the loss, it may lose its entire tax offset . 
The local can , however, use it whi ch may be used to offset 
current income tax liabilities or pass it to members . 
A much debated issue today is how cooperatives should 
set up an equity retirement plan. Older members are 
interested in having their equity in the cooperative liqui-
dated when they no longer use the association . Depending upon 
the method used, allocating losses can help or hinder equity 
retirement plans . In many cases, taking the loss from capital 
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surplus can be expected to lengthen the revolving period . But 
if the loss is taken from allocated equities, the cooperative 
can reduce the equity to be retired without an additional 
drain on their working capital. Members receiving retired 
equities are not the onl y beneficiaries of this method. 
Current members benefit also since it was shown that net cash 
flow to all members was positive . Young farmers are often 
more concerned about their cash flow position because they 
have larger debt ob l igations when they begin farming . Perhaps 
most important , the true equity position of the cooperative is 
more clearly understood. 
Legal sound ness 
A number of l egal questions surrounding net operating 
losses of cooperatives are not completely resolved. There are 
no specific procedures required of coopeartives in allocating 
operating losses . I n general , handling losses with these 
constraints has been left to the discretion of the board of 
directors . In the past, a greater portion of the losses have 
been taken from capital surplus rather than from allocated 
equities . This trend may change if the losses expected in 
1983-84 materialize. This could occur simply because some 
cooperatives will not be able to take the entire loss from 
capital surplus without running a significant negative 
balance . The IRS may disallow the practice in the future if 
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current court decisions are any indication of what the future 
might hold for cooperatives. 
Netting of losses between different functions or units 
has been questioned by the IRS but has been allowed in at 
least one case (Ford - Iroquois F. S. , Inc . , 398 supra . ) . If the 
functions are distinct and separate functions, the IRS would 
probably not allow netting because they do not want patrons of 
one function making up for losses in another function . 
Cooperative members f eel that unless it is st ated in the 
by - laws, the netting of losses should be left to the discre-
tion of the board [33] . 
Thus far, there is no reason to believe that netting of 
losses between regional and local cooperatives is illegal 
since local cooperatives play a major role in the operation of 
regional cooperatives . Passing the regional loss t o member 
cooperatives does not seem out of line with the IRS rulings or 
opinions that cu r rent patrons should be the ones who incur the 
1 0 s s . 
Economic impacts on the community 
The entire community is often affected when one business 
incurs a loss . Cash flow is important during these times in 
order to stimulate the local economy . 
Each of the strategies for allocating the losses will 
have an impact on the local economy. The regional 
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cooperative's action is not independent of the local 
community. When the loss was held at the regional cooperative 
and the local cooperative had positive earnings, the net cash 
flow to members was not positive for al l tax brackets. 
Members in the 41 percent tax bracket and above were not 
receiving enough cash to defray their tax liabilities . As a 
result of the regional keeping the loss, more cash was going 
out of the local community . 
A loss that is passed to members by a reduction in their 
allocated equities would have a current positive impact on the 
community. The analysis showed that the members (coll ec-
tively) received a large tax savings due to the loss in 
equities. In addition to the tax savings, the members 
received the entire ITC that was available to the cooperative 
because in those cases the local cooperative did not have any 
taxable earnings. This indicated that thousands of dollars 
would be available for expenditure through the community 
business. 
Summary 
Because of the recent economic situation there is a need 
for a systematic approach to deal with cooperative losses . 
This chapter examined the impacts on the cooperative and the 
cooperative members under the assumption that losses occurred 
in two consecutive years. A simulation model analyzed three 
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methods of treating the loss. Two origins of the los s were 
analyzed: (1) the regional cooperative; and ( 2) the loc al 
cooperative. The regional cooperative had the choice of keep -
ing the loss and decreasing capital surplus (Strategy A) or 
passing the loss to member coopera tives. The member ( l ocal ) 
cooperative then had the choice of keeping the lo~s and 
decreasing capital surplus (S trategy B) or passing the loss to 
its members (Strategy C) . When the source of the loss 
included both the regional and local, it was necessary to use 
Strategy B or Strategy C. 
Through some recent court cases, some guidelines for 
handling the losses have been established . The IRS has als o 
issued opinions on some of the issues . In particular, an 
opinion has been expressed that the current patrons should be 
the patrons who incur the loss. The possibility exists that 
more definite rulings will be made concerning the treatment of 
net operating losses. 
Since the results from all three cooperatives were t he 
same, the Iowa cooperative was selected as a representative 
for the three . The chapter f ocused primarily on how the three 
methods affected the Iowa cooperative and its me mb ers. The 
fol lowing are some general results from the analysis: 
1 ) When the regional cooperative held the loss , i t left 
total assets at the local level unchanged as a result of t he 
loss. There was no reflection on the local cooperative 
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financ ial statement that the regional cooperative had operated 
at a loss . Total assets at the local level were therefore 
overstated if the loss was extremely large at the regional 
level. 
2) Capital surplus was significantly reduced when the 
' local cooperative kept the loss and reduced capital surplus 
for both of the years. The legality of this method is 
questioned and is still pending. Even if it is acceptable 
from the IRS, the financial i mpact on the cooperative and the 
members is questionable. 
3) Total member equity at the local cooperative did not 
depend on how the local cooperative treated the loss . 
However, the regional cooperative ' s action of keeping the loss 
left local member equity greater than if they had passed the 
loss to the local in the form of a negati ve patronage . 
4) Qualified equities were redu ced when the local decided 
to pass the loss t o its members. The decrease in qualified 
equities resulted in a ta x deduction for members . The result 
was a positive net cash flow to members regardless of member 
tax bracket. 
5) If the loss was held at the regional, members would 
receive a patronage refund and pay taxes in years that the 
local had positive earnings . The members in the higher 
average tax brackets (29 percent and above) were not allocated 
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large enough cash patronages to cover their tax liabilities on 
their noncash distributions. 
6) Equity retirement was accomplished in an indirect 
manner when the l oss was taken from allocated equities . If 
capita l sur p lus was redu ced to accou nt for the loss, equity 
retirement is likely to be postponed. 
7) The debt to equity ratio is lower at the local level 
if the regional holds the loss. It is understated in th e 
sense that the mark et value of their equity in the r egiona l 
cooperative has fallen because of the loss . The reduction in 
total equity while not retir in g allocated equity may make 
retirement more difficult and lengthen revolving periods . 
8) In all fa ir ne ss to t he present, past and future 
patrons, the loss should be allocated to the patrons who were 
patrons when the loss occurred. Reducing capital surplus t o 
negative levels would penalize future pa tro ns of the business 
for something they had no co nt rol over. 
9) According to current law, there is no reason to 
believe that ne tting of losses between regional and local 
cooperatives is illegal as long as it can be shown that the 
two entit ie s are not i ndependent of each other. 
10) Passing the loss to local members by decreasin g their 
equity in the cooperative may have a positive impa c t on t he 
community since the tax benefits associated with the loss are 
so great. 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study examined three major financial policy deci-
sions which cooperatives face today . The three issues were : 
(1) the selection of an appropriate depreciation method; ( 2) 
the selection of a fair and equitable method to distribute net 
earnings; and (3) the selection of a method to handle net 
operating losses . 
Depreciatio n Poli cy 
The method of depreciation used by a coope rati ve had an 
effect on working capital, total ta x liability of the coopera -
tive and members, allocated equities, capital surplus, debt to 
equity ratio and net cash flow to members. Si nce depreciation 
can affect so many financial variables, it is important for a 
coope rative to investigate the possibili ties available to them 
and choose the method that is best for their cooperat ive and 
its members on balance. The stu dy focused on rapid - ACRS and 
ACRS-SL methods of depreciation and applied them to three 
cooperatives. 
Alternative strategies for capital investment were not 
i ncluded in the analysis, but implications concerni~g the 
timing of investments could be drawn from t he results. The 
Indiana cooperative had a consta nt investment stream with a 
few i nt ermi tta nt years of heavier invest ments. The Io wa 
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cooperative had one la r ge i nves t me nt in the second year and 
smaller net replacements to fixed assets in the other years . 
The eastern cooperative pursued a heavy investment stream for 
the t en years. Net ear nings corresponded to these investme nt 
pa t ter ns because de preciation expense of the investments was 
an important compo nent in calculating net earnings . During 
years of rapid - ACRS depre c iation , earnings were low . In la ter 
years of t he life of th e asset , rapid - ACRS depreciation ran t o 
zero whic h caused ear ni ngs to increase . Using ACRS - SL , the 
earnings pattern was more stable due to the constant stream of 
depreciation expense over the life of the asset . 
Hig her levels of working capital generated much earlier 
in the depreciation period were obtainable when rapid-A CRS was 
used instead of ACRS-SL. Distributions to members were 
smaller overall in the rapid-ACRS (TAX) runs; therefore, the 
total working capital drain for the cash portion of qualified 
allocations was l ess . As the level of cash patronage 
increased , the gap bet ween working capital generated from 
rapid - ACRS runs and ACRS-SL runs increased oecause larger 
amounts of cash were distributed to members in the ACRS - SL 
runs . Working capital in the nonqualified runs was also 
greater when rapid-ACRS wa s instead of ACRS - SL. Thi s was due 
to a smaller co rporate tax liability on the smal ler rapid-ACRS 
(TAX) earnings . Investment ta x credit could also be used more 
effectively. 
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Another benef i t of rapid-ACRS depreciation wa s observed . 
The total member and corporate ta x liability required in 
rapid - ACRS runs was less than the total member and corporate 
tax liability in ACRS - SL runs in almost every situation . A 
notable exceptio n occurred when the average tax liability of 
members "centered" at 20 percen t. The overa l 1 tax savings 
from using rapid-ACRS instead of ACRS - SL increased in quali-
fied runs as the average ta x liability of members increased . 
Th is was due to the fact that t he cooperative member s were 
paying the greatest portion of the tax burden . 
The level of cash patronage paid, and the marginal tax 
liability of members ' determined the advantage or disadvantage 
of rapid - ACRS on net cash flow to members . If a cooperative 
paid 30 per cen t cash patronage, all members received more net 
cash flow when rapid-ACRS was used instead of ACRS -SL. How -
ever , at a level of 45 percent cash patronage , ACRS - SL 
resul te d in higher l evels of cash flow to members in lo w aver -
age tax brackets (20 - 35 percent), while rapid - ACRS deprecia -
tion resulted in more net cash to members in high average tax 
brackets (41 percent and above) . 
The eastern cooperative s howed unique net cash flow 
patterns . The cooperative wa s forced to reduce allocated 
equities in two loss years because they had no unallocated 
capital surplus to reduce . The tax savings to members because 
of the noncash loss in those two years was so great that over 
224 
the t e n pr oject i on years members received more c a sh flow when 
rapid - ACRS depreciation was use? instead of ACRS - SL deprecia -
tion . Members in the 20 percent marginal tax bracket were the 
only group whic h would have received more if ACRS - SL had been 
use d un de r the se c i rc um s t ances. 
The equity account grew faster when ACRS - SL was used 
bec ause membe r dis t r i butions were larger than member distribu -
tions i n rapi d - ACRS r uns . Ho wever , the equity results changed 
wh en BTT r eco nci liati on statement was used . The BTT state -
me nts .e xhi b ited a higher leve l of allocated equities than 
either rapid - ACRS or ACRS - SL calculations. It was found in 
this s tu dy and in a recent staff paper by Ginder and Geu that 
usi ng BTT acco unt i ng r es ult s in greater growth i n allocated 
equities than eit her rapid - ACRS or ACRS - SL [27] . BTT also 
ge nerated more wor ki ng capital in earlier years due t o the 
deferred taxes , of basing taxable earnings on rapid - ACRS earn -
ings in stead of ACRS - SL ear ni ngs . 
BTT acco unti ng a l so resolved a problem that was 
encountered with rapid - ACRS . Rapid - ACRS depreciation resulted 
in distributions th a t were smal l during the initial deprecia-
tion years and dis t r i butions that were large in later years . 
Questio ns can be rais ed as to whet her or not this process 
treats all members fairly and equitably . The ones who were 
members in the years that rapid - ACRS depreciation was taken 
were paying more heavily for the assets which members in 
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future years would also benefit from . However , when BTT 
accounting was used the problem wa s alleviated . The members 
received nonqual ified distributions based on ACRS - SL earnings 
instead of rapid-ACRS earnings. This system spread the 
distributions to members i n accordance with the useful l ife of 
the asset. Hence , members were treated fairly and equitably 
by using BTT . 
ERTA 1981 has opened the door to quicker cost recovery 
systems for cooperatives. A depreciation policy that includes 
rapid-ACRS may not be beneficial for every cooperative . How -
ever, when rapid - ACRS was used in co njunction with BTT 
accounting the advantages were widespread. 
Earnings and Distributions Policy 
In order for a distribution policy to be acceptable under 
cooperative principle, it should treat members fairly and 
equitably . There are two dimensions to membership that a 
coopera tive must consider. These include : ( 1) young and old 
members, and (2) current and future members . Another 
criterio n that board members consider in a distribution policy 
is growth in the cooperative. Initially, members may be 
pleased t o receive their entire distribution in cash but the 
cooperative would be short lived s ince most cooperatives 
gather member equity capital by retaining portions of their 
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distributions; the high cash payout threatens the main 
capitalization mechanism. 
Two forms of allocations were anal yzed in this study . 
They were : (1) qualified written notices of allocation, and 
(2) nonqualified written notices of a l location . A f ew of the 
criteria for comparisons were: (1) working capital, (2) total 
tax liability, (3) equities; and (4) member net cash flow. In 
order for an allocation to be qualified, at least 20 percent 
of the distribution must be in cash. This study looked at 
higher levels of cash patronage because for most members 20 
percent of the distribution in cash wa s not adequate to defray 
the tax liabil ity from the entire distribution they receive. 
The levels used were 30, 40, and 45 percent cash patronages . 
The feasibility of qualified allocations was determined 
largely by the level of cash patronage. 
The working capital generated by qualified runs was 
greater than the working capital in nonqualified runs at lower 
levels of cash patronage (30 and 40 percent ) . At 45 percent 
cash patronage, the nonqualified runs resulted in more working 
capital to the coo perative. The cash pay - out for the patron -
age refund on qualified allocations exceeded the cash pay-out 
for the corporate tax liability on the nonqualified alloca -
tions. Nonqualified allocations also resulted in lower total 
member and corporate tax liability than qualified allocations . 
The stream of ta xes paid for the ten years was less with 
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nonqualified allocations in all three cooperatives . There -
fore, the tax savings of allocating nonqualifieds instead of 
qualified allocations compounded over the ten years was a 
sizable amo unt. 
The net cas h f low to members depended upo n member margi -
nal tax bracket. Members in the lower marginal tax brackets 
(20 to 35 percent) received more net cash when the a l l ocat i on 
was qualified. Members in the upper margin~l tax brackets 
(35 percent and above ) received more net cash when nonquali -
fied allocations were distributed . Nonqualified al locations 
resulted in equal ailocations t o all members because the 
coo perative assum ed the tax liab i lity on the distributi on . 
True potent ia l a ll ocated equities could be seen if BTT 
accounting was used . In our analysis , only nonqualified 
allocations were used because the legality of distributing 
qualified allocations in BTT situations is questionable . The 
study was limited to 11 no retirement" cond itions in the BTT 
runs . Further research is needed in the area of equity 
retirement and the use of BTT accounting. 
Qualified and nonqualified allo cations were examined in a 
limited equity retirement situation . Four percent of the pool 
of qualified equ iti es were retired in all 10 years . Since 
nonqualifieds were not retired, the conclusions which can be 
drawn are limited . The impact on working capital is substan -
tial when qualified equities are retired in a qualified run . 
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The higher the level of cash patronage paid, the greater 
is the drain on working capital. The length of time that a 
cooperative would be able to co ntinue retiring qualified 
equities and maintain a high cash payout would be limited. 
The revolving period would probably be extended in order to 
maintain adequate working capital. Further research on 
retiring nonqualified equities would be beneficial because the 
working capital situation of the cooperative would be 
different than in the runs where qualifieds are retired. The 
cooperative can take a tax deduction when nonqualified 
equities are retired; therefore, more working capital would be 
available to the cooperative. The fact that no cash payout is 
required on nonqualified distributions would further help this 
situation. 
The use of nonqualified allocations by cooperatives has 
been limited to this point. A lack of information co ncern ing 
the advantages of nonqualifieds is one major reason why they 
haven't been used. The results in this study have shown that 
nonqualified allocations are a viable alternative to qualified 
allocation . 
Handling Net Operating Losses 
Coo perative poli cy concerning net operating losses has 
been limited. This has been true partly because widespread 
losses have not been common in the past. In addition, the 
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scale of losses has been smaller in general. In the analysis, 
the cooperatives were subjected to three alterna t ives to 
handle the loss . These were: (1) holding the loss at the 
regional cooperative ; (2) reducing local capital surplus for 
the loss; and (3) reducing local member equities t o account 
for the loss . The Iowa cooperative wa s the focus for the 
report analysis although all three cooperatives exhibited the 
same patterns . 
The impact on the local cooperative when a loss was held 
at the regional cooperative depended on t~e size of the loss . 
The major effects were unseen in the balance sheets and 
operating statements of t he local cooperative . Investments in 
other cooperatives were un cha nged at the local level. 
However, the results have sho wn that a large loss at the 
regional cooperative not reflected at the local level by a 
reduction in their investments resulted in an overstatement of 
total assets at the local cooperative. The actual value of 
the investments had declined because of the regional loss . If 
the loss had been sma ll, and in the follo wing year the 
regional had positive net savi ngs, there would be less 
concern . But after several years of large losses at the 
regional cooperative , the asset structure at the local 
cooperative would not reflect the true financial position of 
the cooperative . This is a dangerous situation for the local 
cooperative . Lenders may be skeptical about c redit quality in 
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a cooperative in this position if the asset structure were to 
be carefully examined. 
Another undesirable result of the regional holding the 
loss was the effect it had on member net cash flow. Th e net 
cash f lo w to members in marginal tax brackets above 23 percent 
was negative when the local cooperative had net earnings. The 
ITC was used at the cooperative level to offset the tax 
liability from earnings. Further results indicated that ITC 
would not be wasted on an overstated cooperative tax liability 
if the loss would have been passed to the local cooperatives. 
When the loss was passed to the local cooperative, net 
local earnings were negative. Therefore, the cooperati ve did 
not have any tax liability and the ITC was passed to members. 
Local earnings ( if positive ) went toward building wor k ing 
capital . When the loss was taken from local unal lo cated 
cap ital surplus , the members did not receive a taxable distri -
bution. The cash flow they received was entirely ITC . 
The legality of th is method is questi onable . The IRS is 
concerned about fair and equitable treatment of members. The 
service is skeptical when the entire loss is taken from 
unallocated capital surplus because future members are bearing 
the burden of the loss along with the current patrons. 
Another legal question arose from the situation where the 
ca pital su rplus account ran a nega tive balance in the Iowa 
coo perat iv e. In essence, the loss was ca rried f or war d . 
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Corporations are allowed to carry - forward and carry-backward 
losses . In the opinion of the IRS ( due to the nature of coop-
eratives), this practice is questionable . Cooperatives 
electing this method of allocation should be aware that there 
are legal i ss ue s stil l pending. 
From the analysis, passing the losses to members by 
decreasing allocated equities appeared to be the best alterna-
tive of the three methods. The tax benefits to members would 
provide a stimulus to the entire community surrounding the 
local cooperative . The net cash flow to members was positive 
for members in all tax brackets. Members received IT C in 
addition to the reduction in taxes. The method was fair to 
all members because the loss was allocated to members on the 
basis of patronage in the period that the loss occurred. 
There was also an indirect advantage of passing the los s to 
members . As equity wa s written-off to account for the loss, 
equity was 11 retired 11 without draining the cooperative of 
additional working capital. These advantages, however, must 
be measured against the cash future value of the equity that 
is eliminated to offset the loss. 
Recommendations For Further Research 
Recommendations for further research into the area of 
the distribution of net earnings and losses include the 
following: 
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1) To further investi gate how the investment pattern 
affects the use of rapid- ACRS depreciation . There is evidence 
in this stu dy (Figu re 3.3) that suggests that rapid-ACRS 
depreciation expense and ACRS-SL depreciation expense may 
co nv erge if steady, heavy inve st ment is pursued by the 
coo perative over 10 years . 
2) To examine the impacts of setting a target f or 
maintaining working capital (i .e., 10 percent of sales ) , 
borrowing added funds in deficit years and buying T-bills in 
surplus years, in order to determine the additional time value 
benefits of working capita l when rapid - ACRS is used. 
3) To examine the impa ct on working capital if the 
paradox that occur red on page 48 (i . e., th e cash portion was 
pa id on total distrib ut ion ) is eliminated. This ca n be 
accomplished by paying out equal amounts of cash in COMPANY 
(ACRS - SL) and TAX ( rapid-ACRS) runs. Further investig ation of 
the working capital situation under rapid-ACRS and increasing 
levels of cash patronage. 
4) To examine the effects on the cooperative and the 
members of state ta xation on the distribution of qualified and 
nonqualified equities . 
5) To research the impact on the net cash flow and the 
change in the noncurrent position of members, by tax. bracket, 
given that nonqualified equities are distributed and retired. 
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In addition to the impact on members, the impact on the 
cooperative's working capital, tax liability and equ ity 
position should be analyzed. It was hypothesized in this 
study that the wor king capital of the cooperative would be 
impro ved and that member s would be treated fairly if nonquali-
fied equities are allocated. 
6 ) To further research the use of Book -t o- Tax reconc ili a-
tion statements and the possibility of issuing qualified 
equities for less than the amount of COMPANY ( ACRS-SL) 
earnings. [It is illegal to calculate ta xe s based on TA X 
(r apid-ACR S) earnings and distribute qualified equities based 
on COM~!D'._ earnings.] 
7) To examine the effect of setting a target for growth 
in equities and examine the cooperative's ability to ret ir e 
equities when: ( a ) qualified equities are allocated; and 
( b ) nonqualified equities are al located . 
8 ) To pursue the re sul ts found concerning the regress ive 
impact of social security ta xes and determ i ne at what level of 
cash patronage all members receive posit i ve ( zero ) net cash 
flow. The higher the level of cash patronage that is required 
on the qualified allocation, the more feasible nonqualified 
allocations become for the cooperative, in vie w of the working 
capital drain of the high cash patronage. 
9 ) To investigate the time value benefits of net cash 
flow to members, by ta x bra cket , when: ( a ) qua lified equities 
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are distributed and r etired , and (b ) nonqualified equities are 
dis tr ibuted and retired. 
10) To re sea rch the long-run impa c ts of the methods of 
allocating losses. This would include: ( a) the local 
cooperative's current and non current position, ( b ) the local 
coo perative' s ability t o r et ir e equ iti e s , ( c ) the tax implica -
tions to the cooperative and t o the member s, and ( d ) the net 
cash f low t o members. 
11 ) To further re se ar c h the impa ct of losses on tho se 
cooperatives whi ch do not maintain an unalloca t ed capital 
surplus account. This study indicated that there were 
benefits to the cooperative and the member s under these 
circumsta nces if the loss was passed to the member at the 
local level . 
12) To inv estiga te the co nc ept of "shad ow price " or 
"value" of the regional equ ity at th e local level when the 
loss is held withi n the regional cooperative . Differ ent 
magnitudes of regio nal losses should be examined since the 
s hadow price is a function of the size of the loss. 
13) To i nv es tig ate , in particular, the impac t on working 
capital at the local level when t he l oc al co operative ' s 
ear ni ng s exceed the regional loss. Variables to examine 
include : ( a ) member equity , ( b ) ta x liability of the co opera -
tive and the members, ( c) member net cash flo w, and ( d) other 
variables of i nte r est . 
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14 ) To research the impact of rap i d-ACRS deprec i ation if 
losses occur and compare the results to the straight- li ne 
depreciati on re sult s. 
15 ) To re se arch the inclusion of social se curity ta x 
impacts in th e analysis of the all ocation of losses. This 
study underes timate s the tax sav in gs to members be c ause social 
security taxes were not included . 
16) To research the impact on wor king capital and other 
vari ab les if losses occur and the cooperative co nti nues to 
reti re equities and pay estates. 
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APPENDIX A: DEFINITION OF TERMS 1 
Since cooperatives are a unique form of business, there 
have also been terms that have evolved whi ch are unique to 
co operative financial management . A definiti on of some of the 
terms frequently used in this study are as follows : 
1) Patronage Refunds: Net savings of a cooperative paid 
or al located to a patron in pr oportion to the value or 
quantity of the individual's patronage 
2) Capital Surplus or Retained Earnings: Net savings of 
cooperative wh ich are ritained but not allocated to 
i ndividual patrons 
3) Investment Tax Cre dit: Credit earned by a business 
wh ich can be applied as payment toward federal income 
tax and wh ich is based on investments made during the 
year in eligible property to be used by the busine ss 
4 ) Equity Redempti on : The payment in cash or c ash 
equivalent for previou sl y issued equity 
5) Retained Patronaqe Refunds: Allocated patronage 
refunds left in the cooperativ e , generally re deemed in 
cash at a later date 
1sour c e: Definitions were taken from a series of 
informational articles printed in Farmer Coopera t ives from 
March 1980 to October 1980. 
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6) Net Earnings or Net Savi ng s: Net sales or service 
revenue minus all cos ts, including cost of goods sol d 
and operating expenses , plus other income such as 
refunds from other cooperatives and interest income 
7) Revolv i ng Fund : A system of equity accumulat io n and 
redemption where the earlier investments of me mbers 
are redeemed first . Revolving equity us ually 
originates from retained patronage refunds or per - unit 
capital r etains 
8) Noncash Patronage Refunds: Distributions of net 
savings which are allocated t o patrons and retained by 
the cooperative in various f orms of cer tificate s or 
book credits 
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Figure B.10 Eastern , Member Social Security Tax LiabiliLy , Scenario S 
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Figure 8.1 I Eas t e rn, Member Federal Tax Li a bility, Scenario I 
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Figure B . 1 2 Eastern , Me mb e r Federal Tax Liability , Scenario 2 
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Figure B.L J Eastern , Member Fede ra l Tax Liability , Scenario 3 
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Figu re B. 14 Eastern, Member Feder a l Tax Lia bility , Scenario 4 
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Fig ure B.15 Eas t e rn, Me mbe r Fe d e r al Tax Lia bility , Scen a rio 5 
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Figure B.16 Indiana , Ne t Cash Flow t o Member s , 20% Tax Brac ke t, Scena rio 1 , 
30% Cash Pa tronage 
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Figure B.1 7 India na , Net Cash Fl ow t o Member s , 20% Tax Bracket , Scenario 1, 
40% Cash Patronage 
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Figu re B. 18 Indiana , Net Cash Fl ow t o Member s , 20% Tax Bracket , Scenari o l , 
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Figure B. 19 Indiana, Net Cash Flow to Members, 35% Tax Bracket, Scenario 4 , 
30% Cash Patronage 
1991 
N 
m 
(n 
CJ) 
µ 
<1l 
r-1 
r-1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
~ 
r-1 
- ---- QuJ li f l ed Compa ny 
- - Q11n ll fled Tax 
. • • Nonquu Ii I it:d Compa n y 
20 - · - ·- Nonqut1llfJed Tux 
15 
10 
5 
0 
(5) 
(10) 
............ ............_ -
--......... ---- ---
•. -.-.... ·.-:--r- . '~ - ···- .. ·-···- ·· 
1982 L98J 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Figur e 8 . 20 Indiana , Net Cash Fl ow t o Members , 35% Tax Bracket , Scenario 4 , 
40% Cash Patronage 
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Figure B. 21 Indiana, Net Cash Flow to Members, 35% Tax Bracke t, Scenario 4, 
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Figure B. 22 Indiana , Net Cash Flow t o Members, 50% Tax Bracket, Scenar i o 5 , 
30% Cash Patronage 
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Plgure B. 23 Indiana, Net Cash Flow to Members , 50% Tax Bracket , Scenario 5 , 
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Figure B. 24 Indiana, NeL Cash Flow to Members, 50% Tax Bracket, Scenar i o 5, 
45% Cash Patronage 
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Figure B. 25 Eastern, Net Cash Flow t o Members, 20% Tax Bra cket , Scenario 1, 
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Fi gure B. 26 Eas t e rn, Ne t Cash Flow t o Me mbers , 20% Tax Bracket , Scena rio 1, 
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Figure B.27 Eastern, Net Cash Flow to Members, 20% Tax Bracket, Scenario 1, 
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Figure B. 28 Eas t e rn, Net Cash Flow to Membe r s , 35% Tax Bracket , Scenar l o 4, 30% Casl1 Pat rona~e 
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Figure B. 29 Eastern Net Cash Pl ow t o Member s , 35% Tax Bracket , Scenario 4 , 40% Cash Patron age 
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Figure B. 31 Eastern, Net Cash Flow to Members, 50% Tax Bracket, Scenario 5, 
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Figure B. 32 Ea~tern, Net Cash Fl ow t o Memb e r s , 50% Tax Bracke L, Scenario 5 , 
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Figure B. 33 EasLern, Ne t Casl1 Pl ow t o Members, 50% Tax Br acke t, Scena rio 5 , 
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Figure B. 37 Iowa, ToLal Member Equily , 30% Cash Pa tronage 
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Figure B.39 Iowa, Total Member Equity , 45% Cash Patronage 
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